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INTRODUCTION
In 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court declared, in Lawrence v. Texas,
that state laws criminalizing gay sex were unconstitutional.1 The
decision is ground-breaking because, for the first time in U.S. history,
the highest court in the land determined that gays could not be fined
or imprisoned for private, adult consensual sex, something the Court
only seventeen years earlier did not consider a fundamental right.2
The ruling is also controversial because Americans seem to be deeply
divided when it comes to issues regarding gay rights. While studies
indicate that most Americans support the adoption of laws that grant
gays the most basic of civil rights, like the right to the kind of privacy
in the bedroom that Lawrence envisioned, many also believe that
homosexuality is immoral.3
With respect to the issue of whether or not gays should be able to
marry, a 2005 nationwide poll conducted for the Boston Globe
indicated that forty-six percent of the respondents said they were
against gay marriage and thirty-seven percent said that they supported
it.4 Forty-six percent of those that the Globe surveyed, however, also
indicated that they supported civil unions between gays in which gays
could enjoy “some, but not all, of the legal rights of married couples
while forty-one percent said that they were opposed” to such unions.5
This split in American perspectives is tied to age, with Americans
thirty-five years old and younger decidedly more pro-gay in their
attitudes than their plus sixty-five year old counterparts.6 It is
* Professor of Law, Babson College. B.S., J.D., Georgetown University; Ph.D.,
Northeastern University. Visiting Scholar, University of Westminster School of Law,
London (in association with the AHRC Research Centre for Law, Gender and
Sexuality at Kent University, Canterbury). I would like to thank Lee Badgett, Annie
Ellman, and Kim Westheimer for giving me feedback on earlier drafts of this article,
and the Babson Board of Research for its continuing support.
1. See 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding that gay individuals have the right to
engage in private and consensual sexual conduct free from government
intervention).
2. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (concluding that there is
no fundamental right to engage in “homosexual sodomy”).
3. See Jennifer Loftus, American Liberalization in Attitudes Toward
Homosexuality: 1973-1998, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 762, 778 (2001) (suggesting that the
question of the morality of homosexuality turns not on the minority status of gays and
lesbians but rather on gay sexuality, thus implicating Americans’ adverse and
puritanical ideas about sexual behavior).
4. See Scott S. Greenberger, One Year Later, Nation Divided on Gay Marriage,
BOSTON GLOBE, May 15, 2005, at A1 (describing how public attitudes towards gay
marriage vary according to region and age).
5. See id.
6. See id. (reporting that only thirty-nine percent of respondents between the
ages of eighteen and twenty-four disapprove of gay marriage, as compared to sixtyfour percent of respondents over the age of sixty-five that do not support gay
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therefore possible that many of these issues will become moot, as
younger American voters and policy makers replace their older
counterparts over the next few decades. The inevitability of this
dynamic is reflected in the Globe study results, which revealed that
“[w]hatever their views on gay marriage, most respondents predicted
that some or all states would end up legalizing it.”7
Shortly after deciding Lawrence, the Massachusetts Supreme Court
ruled, in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, that
Massachusetts state law prohibiting gay marriage was unconstitutional
under Massachusetts law.8 Noting that marriage is “an esteemed
institution, and the decision whether and whom to marry is among
life’s momentous acts of self-definition,”9 the court concluded that
state law preventing gays from marrying “is incompatible with the
[state’s] constitutional principles of respect for individual autonomy
and equality under law.”10 “This is a momentous legal and cultural
milestone,”11 said the plaintiff’s lawyer, Mary L. Bonauto of the Gay
and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders (“GLAD”), the public interest
law group that represented the plaintiffs in the case. “The law caught
up with the reality that gay people and their families are part of the
fabric of our communities. At long last, gay and lesbian families and
their children will finally be equal families in the Commonwealth.
This will make a huge difference in people’s lives.”12
Soon after the Goodridge ruling, New Jersey passed a same sex
domestic partnership law in 2004,13 and Connecticut passed a law in
2005 favoring same sex civil unions.14 Several other states now have
domestic partnership laws that give limited rights to gay couples.15
marriage).
7. See id. (stating that ninety-one percent of those who support gay marriage
believe that the impetus to allow homosexuals to marry will spread to other states,
while sixty-three percent of opponents agree that this impetus will spread).
8. 798 N.E.2d 941, 958 (2003) (relying on Lawrence to support the conclusion
that denying civil marriage violates basic principles of equality and autonomy).
9. Id. at 322.
10. Id. at 313.
11. Glad.org, Gay and Lesbian Families Win Marriage Case Before Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, Nov. 18, 2004, http://www.glad.org/News_Room/press6311-18-03.shtml.
12. Id.
13. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8A-2 (West 2004) (stating that all persons in domestic
partnerships, regardless of their sex, should have access to the same rights and
benefits under New Jersey law).
14. See S. 963, 2005 Leg. §§ 1-3 (Ct. 2005) (stating that persons of the same sex
are eligible to enter into a civil union).
15. See HRC.org, Marriage/Relationship Laws: State by State, http://hrc.org/
Template.cfm?Section=Center&CONTENTID=20716&TEMPLATE=/TaggedPage/Ta
ggedPageDisplay.cfm&TPLID=66 (last visited Mar. 22, 2006) [hereinafter
Marriage/Relationship Laws: State by State] (listing state provisions regarding
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A large number of people who label themselves as religious and
politically conservative are not happy with the above developments.16
For these individuals, gay marriage represents the ever increasing
demise of traditional family and religious values.17 Supreme Court
Justice Antonin Scalia sympathizes with this view in his dissenting
opinion in Lawrence.18 He said that
[m]any Americans do not want persons who openly engage in
homosexual conduct as partners in their business, as scoutmasters
for their children, as teachers in their children’s schools, or as
boarders in their home. They view this as protecting themselves
and their families from a lifestyle that they believe to be immoral
and destructive.19

Justice Scalia also warned that the decision could ultimately lead to
the Supreme Court’s endorsement of gay marriage nationwide, and
he observed that “[t]oday’s opinion dismantles the structure of
constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be made between
heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition in
marriage is concerned.”20
Embracing Scalia’s warning, conservative activists and politicians
continue their efforts to pass laws that enable states opposed to gay
marriage to refuse to recognize those marriages when they are
officiated in other states, and to prevent gays from marrying within
their own borders.21 There are forty states that have passed such laws,
by adopting statutory (usually referred to as of Defense of Marriage
Acts or “DOMAs”) or constitutional provisions to this effect.22 As of
this writing, eighteen states passed constitutional amendments
banning same sex marriage, and several others hope to have similar
provisions under consideration in the upcoming election year.23 A
relationship recognition for same sex couples).
16. See Greenberger, supra note 4, at A1 (discussing the Boston Globe’s survey
results, which showed that “Americans older than [sixty-five], Republicans,
Protestants, regular churchgoers, and Southerners” tend to oppose gay marriage).
17. See id. at A1 (quoting a survey participant stating that gay marriage confuses
children and “lowers our moral values because it’s against the Bible”).
18. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(comparing homosexuality to other illegal and immoral practices such as bigamy,
incest and prostitution).
19. Id. at 602.
20. Id. at 604.
21. See Steve LeBlanc, One Year on, Massachusetts’ Gay Marriage Ruling Fuels
Passions, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 14, 2005 (explaining that many states do not want to
permit same sex marriage).
22. See Marriage/Relationship Laws: State by State, supra note 15 (describing
various state bans on the recognition of marriages between same sex couples).
23. See LeBlanc, supra note 21 (summarizing that, while in the past year only one
state, Connecticut, enacted a law legalizing same sex civil unions, Alabama, South
Dakota, and Tennessee are to enact bans on same sex unions next year and almost a
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federal DOMA was passed in 1996, and bills calling for a U.S.
constitutional amendment banning same sex marriage were
introduced in the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives in 2003
and again in 2005.24
Despite the legislative backlash against gay marriage and Justice
Scalia’s misgivings about the Lawrence decision, the Supreme Court’s
rulings in Lawrence and in earlier cases concerning due process and
equal protection under the law make it clear that the right to same
sex marriage is clearly protected by the U.S. Constitution. Whether or
not the Court will adhere to this view, however, is directly related to
two momentous changes that took place on the Court in 2005 and
early 2006. First, Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
announced in the Summer of 2005 that she would be retiring from
the bench after twenty-four years of service.25 Second, before the U.S.
Senate approved Justice O’Connor’s replacement, Chief Justice
William Rehnquist succumbed to a protracted battle with thyroid
cancer, ending a thirty-three year term on the Court.26 The Senate
voted to replace Rehnquist with Bush nominee and federal appeals
court judge John Roberts in the fall of 2005. It then approved Bush
nominee and federal appeals court judge Samuel Alito to replace
Justice O’Connor in January of 2006.27
Chief Justice Rehnquist was no friend to gay rights advocates. He
voted on countless occasions to ignore the rights of gays to enjoy
equal protection under the law.28 Justice O’Connor’s stance on gay
rights issues is a bit more complex. Although she concurred with the
majority opinion’s decision to strike down state anti-sodomy laws in
Lawrence, a close reading of her reasoning in Lawrence leads me to
believe that it is not clear that she would have endorsed a pro-gay

dozen other states are considering following suit).
24. See HRC.org, Marriage Protection Amendment, http://www.hrc.org/
Template.cfm?Section=Federal_Constitutional_Marriage_Amendment (last visited
Mar. 22, 2006) [hereinafter Marriage Protection Amendment] (discussing the failure
of the proposed federal marriage amendment in both the House and the Senate).
25. See Evan Thomas & Stuart Taylor Jr., Queen of the Center, NEWSWEEK, July
11, 2005, at 24-25 (assessing Justice O’Connor’s legacy on the Supreme Court and
examining the importance of her influence as the ‘swing vote’ in many close
decisions).
26. See Charles Lane, Chief Justice Dies at Age 80, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 2005, at
A1 (noting that the Senate was preparing for hearings on John Roberts, who, at the
time of the Chief Justice’s death, was President Bush’s nominee to replace Sandra Day
O’Connor as an associate justice on the U.S. Supreme Court).
27. Charles Babington, Alito Is Sworn in on High Court; Senators Confirm
Conservative Judge Largely on Party Lines, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2006, at A1.
28. See infra notes 312-319 and accompanying text (discussing former Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s conservative leanings on such issues as affirmative action,
abortion, and anti-sodomy laws).
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marriage decision had she decided to stay on the Court.29 Will
Rehnquist and O’Connor’s replacements follow in their footsteps?
While Justice Roberts’ and Justice Alito’s views on gay marriage have
been the subject of much speculation,30 it is my hope that the new
justices will, along with their other colleagues on the Court, keep an
open mind and follow the lead of Canada and the European
Community, where attitudes about gay life and gay marriage are much
more inclusive and open-minded, and where sweeping legislative and
judicial reforms favoring gay rights have been underway for the past
several years.31 Gay marriage is legal in the Netherlands, Belgium,
seven of the ten Canadian provinces, and most recently in Spain.32 In
addition, same sex civil unions have recently become legal in the
United Kingdom.33 Dismantling laws and policies in the U.S. that
hinder movement in a similar direction is long overdue.
Part I of this Article will explore why gay marriage has become such
a contentious issue in the United States, by first examining why some
people in the gay rights movement believe that full equality cannot be
achieved unless gay couples have the right to marry.34 Part I will also
explore debates taking place within the gay community itself about
the merits of making marriage the prime focus of political activism,
when it could be argued that there are other, more pressing social
justice issues that deserve attention, like the fight for economic
equality for all people, regardless of their marital status. Finally, Part I
will look at the views of conservative activists and politicians who hope
to successfully pass DOMAs in all fifty states and the District of
Columbia, as well as a federal constitutional amendment banning gay
marriage.
Part II will cover the three court cases upon which the current
29. See infra notes 320-326 and accompanying text (asserting that Justice
O’Connor has not taken a consistent position on gay rights and adding that it is
impossible to predict how she would rule in a gay marriage case).
30. See infra notes 327-332 and accompanying text (theorizing that while Chief
Justice John Roberts may have a more open attitude towards gay rights than former
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Roberts’ opposition to decisions such as Roe v. Wade could
undermine fundamental rights important to the gay and lesbian community).
31. See Michael Foust, On Views on Homosexuality, U.S. Differs From Canada,
Britain, BAPTIST PRESS, May 27, 2005, http://www.bpnews.net/bpnews.asp?ID=20871
(citing a poll showing that the majority of citizens in Canada and Great Britain say
that homosexuality is “morally acceptable” and favor gay marriage while a majority of
Americans believe that homosexuality is “morally wrong” and oppose gay marriage).
32. See id. (stating that the governing party in Canada is pushing a bill that would
legalize same sex marriages across the country).
33. See id. (explaining that Great Britain’s law granting gay and lesbian couples
all the benefits of marriage take effect in late 2005).
34. See infra Part I.A (including a discussion of historical and contemporary
definitions of marriage and an examination of why some heterosexual and gay people
choose to marry).
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Supreme Court will most probably rely when it next considers a gay
marriage claim. Those cases are the 1967 decision, Loving v.
Virginia,35 in which the Court struck down laws criminalizing
interracial marriage, the 1996 case, Romer v. Evans,36 where the
Court ruled that states could not enact laws that attempt to
permanently exclude gays from being able to participate in the
political process, and the Lawrence case mentioned above.37 In each
of these decisions, the justices relied on the Fourteenth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution to support their rulings.38
Part III will examine how courts have interpreted the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the Constitution,39 which, along with the Fourteenth
Amendment, is the other part of the Constitution most relevant to the
gay marriage debate. The Full Faith and Credit Clause requires each
state to honor the public acts and records of other states.40 Gay rights
advocates believe that gay couples who marry in places like
Massachusetts should be able to get full recognition for their
marriages if they end up moving to other states, even if those states
have passed DOMAs.41 Those who support DOMAs think the
contrary, and hope that courts will apply jurisprudence that allows
states to ignore the public acts of other states in certain limited
instances.42
The last section will consist of my conclusions. I will look at the
legacies of Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor with respect to gay
35. 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) (holding that a Virginia law prohibiting interracial
couples from marrying was unconstitutional because it denied individuals the
fundamental right to marry and violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
36. 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (striking down a state constitutional amendment
that prohibited any pro-gay anti-discrimination legislation).
37. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that personal decisions
made about sexual relationships are a liberty interest protected under the Due
Process Clause).
38. See infra Part II.B-C (explaining how the Supreme Court’s application of the
Fourteenth Amendment in cases not related to race has laid the ground for
constitutional challenges to anti-gay legislation).
39. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (stating that each state must give ‘full faith and
credit’ to the laws of other states).
40. See id. (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by
general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings
shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”)
41. See, e.g., Steve Sanders, Op-Ed., Full Faith for Judgments, NAT’L L. J., Feb. 21,
2005, at A27 (arguing that a state’s refusal to recognize same sex marriages from
another state will have the consequence of arbitrarily depriving gays and lesbians of
property merely on account of their sexuality).
42. See id. (describing how the federal DOMA permits states to refuse to honor
other state statues and judgments regarding same sex marriage that are contrary to
their policies).
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rights issues, discuss how Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Samuel
Alito might rule on these topics, and also predict that, barring the
virtually impossible chance that legislators will amend the U.S.
Constitution, there is a strong chance that the new Supreme Court
will rule that gay marriage is worthy of constitutional protection.43
I. Gay Marriage and the Current Political Climate
A. What Is Marriage?
1. Civil v. Religious Marriage
Before launching into a discussion of gay marriage and the current
political climate surrounding it, the terms “marriage,” “gay marriage,”
“civil unions,” and “domestic partnerships” should be defined. The
2005 online version of the American Heritage College Dictionary
defines marriage as “[t]he legal union of a man and woman as
husband and wife . . . . A union between two persons having the
customary but usually not the legal force of marriage: a same sex
marriage . . . . A close union.”44 A 1993 hard copy edition of the
same dictionary only refers to opposite sex couples, and sidesteps the
question of same sex marriage altogether.45 It defines marriage as
“the legal union of a man and a woman as husband and wife.”46
While the newer, more inclusive definition of marriage is devoid of
the kind of politically polarizing commentary that can be found in the
press and on most talk radio today, it reflects a monumental cultural
shift in both language use and attitudes over the last two decades. Gay
marriage, at least according to this leading chronicler of cultural
phenomenon, now stands right next to heterosexual marriage as an
alternative form of matrimony.
Those religious and political
conservatives who are opposed to gay marriage would probably beg to
differ.
Indeed, it is important to note that neither of the above two
definitions refers to the kind of marriage or union that would be
performed as part of a religious ceremony. Both refer to legal unions
with the implication being that marriage is grounded in civil, not
natural law. Support for this perspective can be found in the
43. See infra Conclusion.
44. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000),
available at http://education.yahoo.com/ reference/dictionary/entry/marriage.
45. See AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 832 (3d ed. 1993) (omitting
same sex marriage from the definition of marriage but including a definition of
marriage as “a close union”).
46. Id.
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Goodridge v. Department of Public Health decision rendered in
Massachusetts two years ago:
Simply put, the government creates civil marriage.
In
Massachusetts, civil marriage is, and since pre-Colonial days has
been, precisely what its name implies: a wholly secular institution.
No religious ceremony has ever been required to validate a
Massachusetts marriage. In a real sense, there are three partners to
every civil marriage: two willing spouses and an approving State.47

The view that the rules for marriage should be based solely on civil
law, however, is the subject of much legal, political, and social debate.
For many Americans, for instance, the views of the Vatican have much
greater currency than the views of the Massachusetts Supreme Court.
In a set of guidelines issued the same year that the Goodridge case was
decided, the Vatican said that “[m]arriage exists solely between a man
and woman . . . . Marriage is holy, while homosexual acts go against
the natural moral law.”48 The Vatican also urged Roman Catholic
legislators “to vote against bills legalizing gay marriage, and where
they already exist, work towards repealing them.”49
2. The Legal and Financial Benefits of Marriage
There are numerous benefits that married couples, as opposed to
non-married people, enjoy. For instance, in Massachusetts, which is
currently the only state in the country that allows gays to marry,50
each member of a married couple enjoys such benefits as the
following: ability to file jointly on their state tax returns; participate in
a tenancy by the entirety, in which the surviving spouse automatically
inherits the deceased spouse’s property unless the deceased spouse
had a will that said otherwise; and take advantage of the homestead
protection, in which the couple’s home is protected from creditors in
the event that one spouse dies.51
47. See 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (2003) (citing Commonwealth v. Munson, 127 Mass.
459, 460-466 (1879)) (noting that “in Massachusetts, from very early times, the
requisites of a valid marriage have been regulated by statutes of the Colony, Province,
and Commonwealth,” and surveying marriage statutes from 1639 through 1834).
48. Vatican Fights Gay Marriage, CNN.COM, July 31, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/
2003/WORLD/Europe/07/31/Vatican.gay.marriages/index.html.
49. Id.
50. See Marriage/Relationship Laws: State by State, supra note 15 (noting that
Massachusetts began issuing marriage licenses to same sex couples on May 17, 2004).
51. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 955-57 (indicating that other benefits accruing
to married couples include the following: the ability to acquire wages owed to a
deceased spouse by the deceased spouse’s employer, continue operating the
businesses of a deceased spouse; participate in the medical plan of a spouse who is a
state employee; receive monetary compensation for the loss of a spouse who worked
as a fire fighter or police officer killed in the line of duty; have an equitable division
of marital property pursuant to a divorce; sue for a spouse’s wrongful death or loss of
consortium in a tort action; receive compensation for funeral expenses and punitive
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Although the demarcation between domestic partnerships and civil
unions is sometimes unclear, domestic partnerships tend to fall into
two categories: 1) same sex couples whose relationship is
acknowledged by the state or municipality in which they live, or 2)
same sex couples who assert that they are in a committed relationship
in order to get the same work-related benefits that are available to
heterosexual married employees or to apply for the equivalent of
common law marital rights in certain kinds of legal disputes.52 With
respect to the former, gay couples have to register with the state or
municipality in which they live.53 Registration usually does not give
couples additional rights or benefits, but it does amount to a public
recognition of their relationship.54 With respect to the latter, the
assertion can take the form of an affidavit or other writing in which
the couple in question state that they share living expenses and intend
to be in a committed, long term relationship.55
Furthermore, substantive proof supporting the aforementioned
assertions should also be supplied in legal disputes. For instance, in
the 1989 New York case, Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co.,56 the court
determined that the plaintiff was entitled to stay in the apartment of
his deceased same sex partner because the governing New York Rent
and Eviction Regulation allows members of a tenant’s “family” to do
so.57 The court came to this conclusion after reviewing evidence that
the couple had a been in a long term committed relationship in
which they shared a household budget, a joint checking account and

damages arising from tort actions; know that any children born to the couple will be
entitled to a presumption of legitimacy and parentage under state law; and make
health care decisions on behalf of the other spouse in the event that that spouse
becomes physically or mentally incapacitated).
52. See David L. Chambers, Couples: Marriage, Civil Union, and Domestic
Partnership, in JOHN D. D’EMILIO ET AL., CREATING CHANGE: SEXUALITY, PUBLIC POLICY
AND CIVIL RIGHTS 281, 299 (2000) (observing that while public registration for same
sex couples is merely symbolic, and at its purest form does not convey any benefits
onto couples, public and private employers can independently choose to provide the
same benefits for married couples and domestic partners).
53. See id. at 299 (relating that in 1982, San Francisco became the first city to
permit unmarried same sex couples to register as domestic partners).
54. See id. (suggesting that public registration conveys the message that same sex
or unmarried-couple relationships are as worthy of public recognition as are
traditional marriage partnerships).
55. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN., § 26:8A-2 (West 2004) (stating that, in order to
establish a domestic partnership, two non-related persons must demonstrate that they
have entered into a relationship of mutual caring and are jointly responsible for each
other’s common welfare).
56. 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
57. See id. at 55 (concluding that, when the legislature used the term “family” in
a rent regulation, it intended to protect all tenants residing in households with the
characteristics of a normal family).
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three safe deposit boxes, among other things.58
As of this writing, California, the District of Columbia, Hawaii,
Maine and New Jersey all have some form of domestic partnership
laws.59 New Jersey’s 2004 domestic partnership law allows the state’s
gay couples to file jointly on their state tax returns and have hospital
visitation rights, and the law requires insurance companies to make
domestic partner benefits available to state government workers.60
Some municipalities, like San Francisco, also provide some
combination of registration and domestic partner benefits to gay
government workers.61
Vermont (in 2000) and Connecticut (in 2005) are the only two
states to allow civil unions.62 Civil unions are state sanctioned
relationships that usually grant all the benefits of marriage, without
calling it marriage.63 For instance, the new Connecticut law gives
same sex couples “all the same benefits, protections and
responsibilities under law . . . as are granted to spouses in a marriage,”
64 but defines marriage as “applying only to one man and one
woman.” 65

58. See id. (applying an objective test and concluding that the same sex partner
of a deceased tenant fell under a regulation’s definition of family member and
therefore was entitled to protection from eviction).
59. See Marriage/Relationship Laws: State by State, supra note 15 (explaining
that these states allow limited rights to same sex couples but do not necessarily
provide the same federal protections extended to heterosexual married couples).
60. See § 26:8A-2 (describing the receipt of these rights and benefits as integral to
the success and enjoyment of a domestic partnership); HRC.org, New Jersey
Marriage/Relationship Recognition Law, http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?
Section=Federal_Marriage_Amendment1&CONTENTID=21663&TEMPLATE=/Cont
entManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm (last visited Mar. 22, 2006) [hereinafter New
Jersey Marriage/Relationship Recognition Law] (explaining that New Jersey requires
insurance companies to provide coverage for a domestic partner, and while domestic
partners of state employees are entitled to insurance benefits, private employers can
decide whether or not to offer benefits to employees’ same sex partners).
61. See Chambers, supra note 52, at 301 (remarking that San Francisco provides
greater registration and partner benefits than most other cities, requiring employers
who contract with the city to provide benefits to their employees’ partners).
62. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 et seq. (West 2003) (indicating that any two
eligible persons may establish a civil union while marriage is reserved for eligible
heterosexual couples); S. 963, 2005 Leg. (Ct. 2005) (stating that two persons entering
into a civil union may be of the same sex); see also Paul Carrier, House Soundly
Rejects Amendment, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, June 8, 2005, at A1 (relating that
Maine’s House of Representatives rejected a proposed amendment to the state
constitution that would prohibit same sex marriages and civil unions).
63. Brad Knickerbocker, Tug of War Intensifies on Gay-Marriage Issue, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, May 5, 2005, at 2 (noting that many elected officials, conscious of a
growing “pro-marriage” movement, are careful to define marriage as limited to a man
and a woman when enacting statutes approving civil unions between same sex couples
in an effort to distinguish the two).
64. S. 963 § 14.
65. Id.
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It is important to note that no gay couple married in Massachusetts
or in a civil union or a domestic partnership authorized in the above
listed states is able to enjoy certain federal protections that are
available to all American married heterosexual couples.66 Such
protections include the right to take advantage of federal family leave
laws when one partner is ill, the right to receive the federal social
security benefits of a deceased partner, and the right to take
advantage of federal income tax benefits for married couples filing
jointly on their tax returns.67 With respect to the latter, “federal tax
laws require unmarried employees to report as taxable income the
value of health coverage provided to their partners but permit
married employees to exclude it.”68
B. Debates in the Gay Community About the Pros and Cons of Gay
Marriage
It is possible for unmarried gay couples to secure some of the
concrete marital benefits discussed in the Goodridge decision, like
hospital visitation and inheritance rights, as well as the equitable
distribution of post-divorce property, without getting married. They
would need to hire an attorney to do so, however, and this can be a
financially costly process.69 It is therefore easy to understand why
many gay couples would opt to marry when given the chance,70 and
66. See Marriage/Relationship Laws: State by State, supra note 15 (noting that
under Vermont law, couples in civil unions have the same rights and responsibilities
as married couples on the State level, but have no such rights on the Federal level).
67. See HRC.org, Top [Ten] Reasons for Marriage Equality, http://www.hrc.org/
Template.cfm?Section=Center&CONTENTID=14392&TEMPLATE=/ContentManage
ment/ContentDisplay.cfm (last visited Mar. 22, 2006) [hereinafter Top Ten Reasons
for Marriage Equality] (commenting that the children of same sex parents are also
precluded from establishing a legal relationship to both parents under federal law
and are unable to receive important federal protections, such as Social Security
survivor benefits).
68. See Chambers, supra note 52, at 302 (exploring the fact that benefits for same
sex couples under the federal tax statutes may not be as extensive as commentators
think and adding that few gay or lesbian employees avail themselves of partner
benefits when they are offered by employers); see also, Kay Lazar, Double Trouble on
Taxes for Gays Newly Married Facing Two Sets of Filing Rules, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec.
30, 2004, at 1 (describing how same sex married couples in Massachusetts, unlike
heterosexual couples, must file their yearly income tax forms twice: they must file as
single on their federal tax forms because the federal government does not recognize
same sex marriage, and they must file as couple on their state tax forms because
Massachusetts requires married couples to file jointly).
69. See Top Ten Reasons for Marriage Equality, supra note 67 (explaining that
while some rights are available through costly legal proceedings, same sex couples
have no way to access some benefits accorded to heterosexual couples).
70. See Karen Lee Ziner, Same-Sex Marriage: One Year Later—Nothing Less
Than Love, PROVIDENCE J. BULL., May 15, 2005, at B-01 (relating the story of two
women and their daughter who were able to become a legally recognized family after
Massachusetts legalized gay marriage, and they were thus able to obtain basic state
legal protections for their daughter).
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see domestic partnerships and civil unions as ‘“separate but equal’
half measures on the way to fully legalizing same-sex marriage.”71 But
perhaps the most important reason that gay couples prefer same sex
marriage is the symbolic societal recognition that married couples
enjoy as they embark on what they hope will be a journey of mutual
emotional and financial interdependence.
Explaining why he sued the state of Minnesota in 1970 for refusing
to grant him and his partner a marriage license, gay rights pioneer
Michael McConnell said, “I sincerely believe that my love for Jack is as
valid and deep as any heterosexual love, and I think it should be
recognized—I demand that it be recognized!—by the state and
society.”72 McConnell and his partner, Jack Baker, were the first
openly gay couple to bring a lawsuit against their state when the city
clerk in their Minnesota town rejected their request for a marriage
license in 1970.73 The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected their
claims, however, on the grounds that “marriage uniquely involves
procreation and the rearing of children.”74 In addition to losing the
suit, McConnell lost a job that the University of Minnesota had
promised him because of the heightened public attention he received
as a result of the lawsuit.75 He also lost the lawsuit he brought against
the university for refusing to hire him.76 The court ruled that
McConnell had no legally protected right to “foist tacit approval of
this socially repugnant concept upon his employer.”77
Similar legal challenges to state marriage laws were made in the
1970s by several other gay men and lesbians hoping to get their
71. Knickerbocker, supra note 63.
72. Chambers, supra note 52, at 283-284 (citing KAY TOBIN & RANDY WICKER, THE
GAY CRUSADERS 144 (1975)).
73. See id. at 283-285 (recounting how McConnell, a young gay rights activist,
invited the press to come with him and his partner when they went to apply for a
marriage license and, as a result, garnered national attention and likely brought the
concept of legal same sex marriage to the attention of many members of the gay
community for the first time).
74. Id. at 284 (stating that Minnesota’s marriage statute did not permit same sex
marriages and finding that a prohibition on same sex marriage did not violate
McConnell’s Due Process or Equal Protection rights); see also Baker v. Nelson, 191
N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971) (holding that limiting marriage to heterosexual
couples is not irrational or discriminatory because of the deeply founded concept of
marriage as a union between a man and a woman involving the bearing and rearing
of children).
75. See Chambers, supra note 52, at 286 (stating that McConnell filed a suit to get
his job as a librarian back but lost in federal court after a judge found that McConnell
had publicly flaunted his homosexuality and his employer was not required to
tolerate such behavior).
76. See id. (concluding that seeking a marriage license is not constitutionally
protected behavior).
77. Id. (citing McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 1046 (1972)).
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respective states to let them marry.78 All of them were unsuccessful.79
While the 1980s and 1990s produced some temporary successes in
court, they too ultimately failed.80 For instance, several years after the
Hawaii Supreme Court ruled in 1993 that Hawaii’s attempts to
prevent gays from marrying violated the state constitution’s equal
protection clause,81 the Hawaii legislature passed a state constitutional
amendment banning same sex marriage in 1998.82 In that same year,
the Alaskan state legislature amended its constitution to limit
marriage to heterosexual couples in response to a judicial ruling that
such limitations were an illegal form of sex discrimination.83 The
legal and constitutional issues to which suits like this gave rise will be
discussed in greater depth in Parts III and IV.
Despite the setbacks of the 1970s, ‘80s and ‘90s, the desire on the
part of certain members of the gay community to marry has not
diminished.84 If anything, that desire has become even stronger.85
Witness the fact that over 6000 gay couples registered to marry in
Massachusetts in the months immediately following the Goodridge
decision,86 and 3,200 couples applied for marriage licenses in the city
78. See id. at 288 (discussing similar suits brought by Tracy Knight and Margery
Jones).
79. See id. (noting that courts still cite these early decisions as legal precedent
and concluding that the only benefit from these early challenges came from news
articles that depicted gays in a positive manner and increased public awareness of gay
couples’ demands for recognition).
80. See id. (observing that while greater numbers of gays and lesbians were
demanding state recognition of their relationship, many groups were reluctant to
pursue legal challenges after the Supreme Court’s decision in Bowers v. Hardwick in
1986, which many felt was dismissive of gay and lesbian rights).
81. See Baehr v. Levin, 852 P.2d 44, 67-68 (Haw. 1993) (holding that, while there
is no fundamental right to same sex marriage under the Hawaii Constitution,
Hawaii’s marriage laws violate the constitutional right to equal protection by
discriminating against citizens who wish to marry on the basis of sex).
82. See HRC.org, History of Legal Challenges, http://www.hrc.org/Template.
cfm?Section=Center&CONTENTID=15328&TEMPLATE=/ContentManagement/Co
ntentDisplay.cfm (last visited Mar. 22, 2006) [hereinafter History of Legal
Challenges] (recounting that in December 1998, after considerable lobbying by
conservative political groups that opposed gay marriage, Hawaiian citizens voted to
amend the state constitution to restrict marriage to heterosexual couples).
83. See id. (noting that a court decision finding that denial of same sex marriage
was sex discrimination provided the impetus for gay marriage opponents who placed
intense political pressure on the legislators to propose the amendment).
84. See Gay and Lesbian Families Win Marriage Case Before Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, supra note 11 (stating that granting gay couples the right to
marry shows that the law is beginning to catch up with the fact that gay people and
families are becoming a “part of the fabric of our communities”).
85. Cf. Greenberger, supra note 4 (suggesting that the gay rights movement is
gaining support as the older generations, who are more likely to oppose gay
marriage, pass away).
86. See LeBlanc, supra note 21 (positing that Massachusetts could remain the
only state allowing gay marriage for many years because of the intense debate it
spurred in the rest of the country).
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of San Francisco just after the mayor, in an act of social protest,
announced that he would begin issuing marriage licenses to gay
couples in contravention of California state law in February of 2004.87
Commenting on why so many people believe that gay marriage is a
goal worth fighting for, Thomas Stoddard says:
Marriage is much more than a relationship sanctioned by law. It is
the centerpiece of our entire social structure, the core of the
traditional notion of “family.” Even in its present tarnished state,
the marital relationship inspires sentiments suggesting that it is
something almost superhuman . . . .
. . . Lesbian and gay men are now denied entry to this “noble”
and “sacred” institution. The implicit message is. . . [that] [g]ay
relationships are somehow less significant, less valuable.88

The Human Rights Campaign (“HRC”), one of the largest gay
rights advocacy groups in the country, echoes Stoddard’s views.89 In a
page on their website called “Top 10 Reasons for Marriage Equality,”
the campaign says:
Gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender people grow up dreaming of
falling in love, getting married and growing old together. Just as
much as the next person, same-sex couples should be able to fulfill
that dream. We know from anecdotal evidence that after same-sex
couples have a commitment ceremony, their friends and family
treat them differently—as a married couple. Shouldn’t they, too,
have the legal security that goes along with that? 90

While the HRC and other pro-marriage advocacy groups like the
Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders (“GLAD”) have been very
successful making their case in the media and in the courts in recent
years, other competing voices in the gay community have not been as
successful.91 For instance, there are many gay rights advocates who
believe that the push for same sex marriage is a misguided attempt by
certain members of the gay community to assimilate into mainstream
87. See Mary Leonard-Ramshaw, Mayor Vows to Continue Same-sex Marriage
Licenses Assails Bush, Sees ‘Shameful’ Political Bid, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 25, 2004, at
B7 (recognizing that Mayor Gavin Newsom faced criticism for issuing the marriage
licenses from those opposed to gay marriage and those who supported it and felt that
Newsom’s action undermined legal efforts to promote gay marriage).
88. Thomas B. Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek The Right To Marry,
OUT/LOOK 8-12 (1989), reprinted in WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE & NAN D. HUNTER,
SEXUALITY, GENDER AND THE LAW 819 (1997).
89. See Top Ten Reasons for Marriage Equality, supra note 67 (noting that
allowing same sex marriage would both move civil rights forward and help to remedy
the inequities of the past).
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., Leonard-Ramshaw, supra note 87, at B7 (discussing the backlash
from the San Francisco mayor’s decision to issue marriage licenses to same sex
couples without legislative approval, which some gay activists felt bolstered efforts to
pass anti-gay marriage amendments in other states).
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heterosexual culture at a time when what is really needed is a
challenge to that culture.92 People in this camp often come from the
civil, women’s and gay rights movements of the 1960s and ‘70s, a time
notorious for the oppressive way in which mainstream America
resisted the inclusion of African-Americans, women and gays into all
walks of American life.93 Those who hold this view might point to the
fact that historically, traditional marriage and the laws that supported
it were “exceptionally harsh toward women who became wives: a
woman’s legal identity all but evaporated into that of her husband.”94
As the court in Goodridge observed, before slavery ended in
Massachusetts, “the condition of a slave resembled the connection of
a wife with her husband, and of infant children with their father. He
[was] obliged to maintain them, and they [could not] be separated
from him.”95
Understandably suspicious of anything that was connected to
government, patriarchy, racism or capitalism, these activists advocated
for “sexual liberation and radical social change.”96 As Paula L.
Ettelbrick says:
[M]aking legal marriage for lesbian and gay couples a priority
would set an agenda of gaining rights for a few, but would do
nothing to correct power imbalances between those who are
married . . . and those who are not. Thus, justice would not
be gained.
. . . Those who are more acceptable to the mainstream
because of race, gender, and economic status are more likely
to want the right to marry.
. . . [W]hat good is the affirmation of our [marital]
relationships. . . if we are rejected as women, people of color,

92. See Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When is Marriage a Path to Liberation?,
OUT/LOOK 8-12 (1989), reprinted in WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE & NAN D. HUNTER,
SEXUALITY, GENDER AND THE LAW 817-18 (1997) (arguing that the campaign to legalize
gay marriage undermines the purpose of the gay rights movements by forcing the
assimilation of gays into heterosexual society while justice for gay men and lesbians
can only be achieved by forcing society to accept them despite their differences).
93. See CHRIS BULL & JOHN GALLAGHER, PERFECT ENEMIES: THE BATTLE BETWEEN
THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT AND THE GAY MOVEMENT 9 (Madison Books 2001) (1996)
(noting that the early gay rights activists were strongly encouraged by the increased
awareness produced by the actions of other minorities, and saw an opportunity to
change class awareness for all disenfranchised groups).
94. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 967 (Mass. 2003) (citing
C.P. KINDREGAN, JR., & M.L. INKER, FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 1.9-1.10 (3d ed.
2002)).
95. Id. at 967 (quoting Winchendon v. Hatfield, 4 Mass. 123, 129 (1808)).
96. See BULL & GALLACHER, supra note 93, at 201 (noting that during the early
decades the gay rights movement was dominated by a few left-wing activists, but grew
to include more diverse viewpoints as the movement mirrored AIDS consciousness
and the conservative atmosphere of the 1980s and 1990s).
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or working class?97
Or as Laura Kiritsy puts it, “[t]he unfortunate reality is that many
GLBT ethnic and racial minorities, like their heterosexual peers, are
more consumed with finding decent jobs, adequate housing, meeting
basic healthcare needs and dealing with immigration issues than with
planning a wedding reception.”98
For people like Ettelbrick and Kiritsy, radical social change needs to
involve not simply dispensing marital benefits to yet another small
and privileged segment of society—same sex couples in long term,
monogamous relationships—but also recognizing “the relationships
that citizens view as significant to themselves, relationships that might
include more than two intimately involved persons and relationships
that have no sexual component.”99 If this model were followed, for
example, an eighty year old heterosexual man living with his ninety
year old heterosexual male friend might be able to get access to the
equivalent of the friend’s health insurance and social security spousal
death benefits if the friend had listed him as a designated
beneficiary.100 Married people would therefore no longer be singled
out for special treatment, and the economic playing ground for
people in all kinds of significant relationships who are economically
needy, as well as single people, would be drastically leveled.101
I tend to agree that the institution of marriage draws an arbitrary
circle around people who are deemed more deserving than others of
certain kinds of rights and privileges that should really be available to
everyone, not just married people. Marriage is a package deal, a
cluster of rights and responsibilities that immediately come into
existence the moment wedlock occurs.102 It would be far more
equitable to allow any two or more people who choose to disassemble
that package and negotiate a contract that distributes these rights and
97. Ettelbrick, supra note 92, at 817-18.
98. Laura Kiritsy, Rainbow Coalition: GLBT Leaders Try to Get People of All
Races to Talk Amongst Themselves, BAY WINDOWS, July 21, 2005, available at
http://www.baywindows.com/media/paper328/news/2005/07/21/News/Rainbow.
Coalition-963685.shtml.
99. Chambers, supra note 52, at 300.
100. See, e.g., New Jersey Marriage/Relationship Recognition Law, supra note 60
(noting that New Jersey’s domestic partnership law does not require proof of a sexual
or romantic relationship and both parties must not be related by blood, so two nonrelated elderly men of the type just described might be able to become domestic
partners in New Jersey).
101. See Top Ten Reasons for Marriage Equality, supra note 67 (asserting that only
gay marriage will level the playing field for gays as to married heterosexual couples
because marriage confers over 1,000 benefits on heterosexual couples).
102. See Stoddard, supra note 88, at 819 (surveying both the legal advantages
granted to married couples as well as those that arise by custom, such as health
benefits from employers, which often extend to spouses).
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responsibilities among themselves as they see fit. Many of the
package’s individual attributes—increased financial security,
protection during times of illness, inheritance rights, and even the
rights and responsibilities of parents with respect to any children that
might be involved—can easily be accommodated contractually.103 In
fact, traditionally gay couples have had no other choice, and have
taken this approach in order to resolve these issues.
The type of thinking just outlined, however, is probably too radical
to be popular in today’s market driven America. It is also not
sufficiently assimilationist in tone or in content for those moderate
and liberal heterosexual Americans who might be sympathetic to the
argument that gay people are just like everybody else to embrace.
Such individuals, as the HRC website quoted above implies, simply
wish for the ability to go to work, marry the person they love, and raise
a family and worship at the church, temple or the mosque of their
choice.104 The fact that Chief Justice Marshall embraced the
assimilationist rhetoric in the Goodridge case demonstrates the extent
to which it has gained currency in a movement that was once, at least
in part, associated with much more radically progressive politics.105
Marshall noted that the claimants in Goodridge included:
business executives, lawyers, an investment banker, educators,
therapists, and a computer engineer. Many are active in church,
community, and school groups . . . . Each plaintiff attests a desire to
marry his or her partner in order to affirm publicly their
commitment to each other and to secure the legal protectionsand
benefits afforded to married couples and their children.106

She continues, “Civil marriage anchors an ordered society by
encouraging stable relationships over transient ones,”107 and by trying
to prohibit same sex marriage, the state wrongly “confers an official
stamp of approval on the destructive stereotype that same-sex
relationships are inherently unstable and inferior to opposite-sex
relationships and are not worthy of respect.”108
103. But see id. (noting the problems with trying to gain these rights through
contract, including the expense incurred, the need for competent legal counsel, and
the inherent incompleteness of the rights acquired as compared to those gained
through marriage).
104. See Top Ten Reasons for Marriage Equality, supra note 67 (surveying the
myriad of advantages to couples who are married as opposed to unmarried couples,
including over 1,049 benefits given to married heterosexual couples by federal law).
105. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 962 (Mass. 2003)
(holding that granting same sex marriages supports “the modern family in its many
variations”).
106. Id. at 949.
107. Id. at 954.
108. Id. at 962.
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As the above demonstrates, the assimilationist argument appears to
be the “cost” of equal protection, or at least some abbreviated form of
equal protection. As Nancy Polikoff says, “[d]emands for social
change often have begun with a movement at first articulating the
rhetoric of radical transformation and then later discarding that
rhetoric to make the demands more socially acceptable . . . [by
issuing] reassurances promising that such transformation is not what
the movement is about at all.”109 So it is with current demands for
gay marriage. Even though I am concerned about the privileging
dimensions of marriage, I still think that gay marriage should be
legalized, because failure to do so infringes on certain basic individual
privacy rights and liberties that the Constitution guarantees.110
Furthermore, perhaps the legal sanctioning of gay marriage will
contribute to increased tolerance and approval of other kinds of
people who are society disenfranchised, even when those people are
not as educated or as well off as the corporate executives, attorneys,
and bankers hailed in Goodridge.111
With respect to the gay rights community, as Chris Bull and John
Gallagher observe in their book on the religious right and the gay
rights movements, Perfect Enemies, the need for increased respect
and approval has been steadily building for decades.112 The authors
note that “[b]y the . . . 1990s . . . [t]he fierce, long-simmering debate
among the community’s intellectual leaders over assimilation—
whether gays were just another ethnic group to be absorbed by
America’s melting pot or a distinct subculture. . . that desires no part
of the larger, corrupt society—sounded increasingly outdated”113 to
those gays who simply wanted acceptance from their families and
their communities. Gays therefore want to marry, says David
Chambers, “less, it seems, for the legal benefits that might flow from it
than for the symbolism of formal equality. The tenacity of the
conservatives’ resistance is the measure of [this] need.”114

109. Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and
Lesbian Marriage Will Not “Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every
Marriage,” 79 VA. L. REV. 1535, 1541 (1993).
110. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding a right to
marital privacy in the Fourteenth Amendment); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)
(interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
111. See 798 N.E.2d at 949 (implying the validity of the plaintiffs’ request for the
right to marry by referencing their professional jobs).
112. See BULL & GALLAGHER, supra note 93 (tracing the evolution of the battle
between the gay rights movement and the religious right from the 1960s through the
1990s).
113. Id. at 201.
114. Chambers, supra note 52, at 303.
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C. THE DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE MOVEMENT
1. Conservative Religious and Secular Objections to Gay Marriage.
As mentioned previously, the 2005 Boston Globe survey indicates
that most people who are against gay marriage describe themselves as
religious conservatives.115 The objections to gay marriage that are
raised by people who self-identify in this manner are very different
from the kinds of objections to it made by progressive gay rights
activists.116 For instance, Gary Bauer, president of the religious
conservative group, American Values, believes that marriage should
be limited to unions between men and women.117 According to one
journalist, Bauer refers to gay marriage as “‘the new abortion’ . . . a
culture-altering change being implemented by judicial fiat.”118
Furthermore, the Southern Baptist Convention, one of the largest
conservative Christian denominations in the United States, asserts in
its official position statement on sexuality:
We affirm God’s plan for marriage and sexual intimacy—one man,
and one woman, for life. Homosexuality is not a “valid alternative
lifestyle.” The Bible condemns it as sin. It is not, however,
unforgivable sin. The same redemption available to all sinners is
available to homosexuals. They, too, may become new creations in
Christ.119

In a 2004 speech, President Bush, himself a self-identified Christian
conservative, also used religion to justify his opposition to gay
marriage by stating that “[t]he union of a man and woman is the most
enduring human institution . . . honored and encouraged in all
cultures and by every religious faith . . . . Marriage cannot be severed
from its cultural, religious and natural roots without weakening the
115. See Greenberger, supra note 4 (describing those most likely to oppose gay
marriage as “older than [sixty-five], Republicans, Protestants, regular churchgoers,
and Southerners”).
116. Compare Russell Shorto, What’s Their Real Problem with Gay Marriage? It’s
the Gay Part, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2005, at 34 (asserting that religious conservatives
oppose gay marriage because they believe it is against their religion and because they
believe marriage is limited to a man and a woman in the Bible), with Polikoff, supra
note 109, at 1536 (stating that she believes that the gay and lesbian rights movement
should not focus on marriage because “the desire to marry in the lesbian and gay
community is an attempt to mimic the worst of mainstream society”).
117. See Shorto, supra note 116, at 34 (noting that Bauer’s views and the views of
others opposed to gay marriage “are based on their readings of the Bible, their views
about both homosexuality and . . . marriage and the political force behind the
issue”).
118. Id.
119. Southern Baptist Convention, http://www.sbc.net/aboutus/pssexuality.asp
(last visited Mar. 22, 2006).
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good influence of society.” 120
Other anti-gay marriage advocates stress the importance of
heterosexuality to the rearing of children and the protection of
families.121 As writer Jeff Jacoby argues, “[t]he core of marriage has
always and everywhere been the pairing of a man and a woman
because no other arrangement can do what marriage does: produce
the next generation, bind men to the women who bear their children,
and give boys and girls the mothers and fathers they need.”122
What none of the above objections to gay marriage acknowledge,
however, is that marriage has long since become unmoored from its
heterosexual, pro-procreative origins, origins which for centuries
facilitated the subjugation of women to men.123 For instance, in early
American history, a “woman’s legal identity all but evaporated into
that of her husband.”124 As the Court in Goodridge observed, “‘the
condition of a slave resembled the connection of a wife with her
husband, and of infant children with their father. He [was] . . .
obliged to maintain them, and they [could not] . . . be separated from
him.’”125 Since the earlier times noted in Goodridge, “[m]arriage has
undergone many changes, from Old Testament times when King
David had multiple wives and concubines to today’s monogamy, from
arranged marriages to romance-based marriages, and from banning
to accepting interracial marriages.”126 Somewhere along the way,
“love conquered marriage . . . [in order to] make marriage more
secure by getting rid of the cynicism that accompanied mercenary
marriage and encouraging couples to place each other first in their
affections and loyalties.”127 In addition, it is not unusual to find
young heterosexual couples who use birth control because they have
120. Same-sex Marriage: Bush’s Remarks on Marriage Amendment, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 25, 2005, at A18.
121. See Jeff Jacoby, My Best Wishes, TOWNHALL.COM, May 23, 2005,
http://www.townhall.com/opinions/columns/jeffjacoby/2005/05/23/15499.html
(stating that even though he opposes gay marriage because it does not conform to
the traditional goal of marriage, he still understands the emotional impact of the
same sex marriage issue for the gay movement).
122. Id.
123. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 967 (Mass. 2003)
(indicating that civil marriage has evolved as a public institution through the courts
and legislature “ameliorat[ing] the harshness of the common-law regime”).
124. Id. (citing C.P. KINDREGAN, JR., & M.L. INKER, FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 1.91.10 (3d ed. 2002)).
125. Id. (quoting Winchendon v. Hatfield, 4 Mass. 123, 129 (1808)).
126. Joshua Glenn, Sins of Sodom?, BOSTON GLOBE, June 5, 2005, available at
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2005/06/05/sins_of_sodom/
(quoting author David Myers).
127. Ellen Goodman, Score One for Cupid, BOSTON GLOBE, May 19, 2005,
available at http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/
2005/05/19/score_one_for_cupid/ (quoting Stephanie Coontz).
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decided not to have children, and elderly heterosexual couples, long
past their child bearing years, who have decided to marry. Ironically,
the defense of marriage movement’s growing political influence
seems to be in direct proportion to the radical transformation that the
institution of marriage has undergone in recent times.
2. The Rise of DOMAs and the Proposed Constitutional Amendment
Banning Gay Marriage
The first state DOMAs were passed by Alaska and Hawaii, both in
1998.128 Today, there are forty states that have state statutes or
constitutional amendments banning gay marriage.129 In November
of 2004 alone, there were eleven states that passed constitutional
amendments banning gay marriage. 130 Eight of those states banned
gay civil unions as well.131 Concerned that they might be required to
recognize civil unions or same sex marriages authorized and
performed in other states, legislators instituted preventative measures
like the one in Nebraska, which says: “Only marriage between a man
and a woman shall be valid or recognized in Nebraska. The uniting of
two persons of the same sex in a civil union, domestic partnership, or
other similar same sex relationship shall not be valid or recognized in
Nebraska.”132 The Nebraska law was overturned by a federal district
court judge in May of 2005 in Citizens for Equal Protection v.
Bruning.133 Bruning will be discussed in greater depth in the
conclusion section of this Article.134
In addition to anti-gay marriage initiatives, other anti-gay rights
initiatives are also underway in several states. For example, the House
of Representatives in Texas voted in 2005 to prohibit gays from
becoming foster parents, and gave the state permission to inquire into
128. See History of Legal Challenges, supra note 82 (discussing the fight for gay
marriage, which began in 1971, but did not gain any success until the 1990s when the
Alaska and Hawaii courts ruled that banning gay marriage was unconstitutional,
which led the legislatures in those state to pass anti-gay marriage legislative measures).
129. See Marriage/Relationship Laws: State by State, supra note 15 (noting that
lawsuits challenging the denial of same sex marriage have been initiated in California,
Florida, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Connecticut and Oregon).
130. See Knickerbocker, supra note 63 (noting that these amendments passed
despite polls which showed that Americans, particularly young Americans, are
increasingly likely to favor civil unions to gay marriage).
131. See id. (noting that conservatives oppose civil unions because gay activists
consider civil unions a step towards acceptance of gay marriage).
132. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29, held unconstitutional by Citizens for Equal Protection
v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Neb. 2005).
133. 368 F. Supp. 2d at 1009 (noting that marriage is among the intimate
relationships granted protection as an element of personal liberty under the Due
Process Clause).
134. See infra notes 350-68 and accompanying text.
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the sexual orientation of people who are currently foster parents.135
In Alabama, one legislator has introduced a bill that would prevent
public funds from being used to “recognize or promote
homosexuality as an acceptable lifestyle,” including portraying same
sex parents in a positive light.136 When asked what would be done
with existing library books and textbooks depicting same sex parents
positively, a Georgia representative said: “‘I guess we dig a big hole
and dump them in and bury them.’”137
Congress passed the federal DOMA, with the approval of
Democratic President Bill Clinton, in 1996, which provides:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian
tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or
judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe
respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is
treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory,
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such
relationship.138

Whether or not federal or state DOMAs or state constitutional bans
on gay marriage can survive legal challenges brought against them
under the U.S. Constitution, however, is questionable because the
Supreme Court will have to apply the Fourteenth Amendment’s
guarantees of due process and equal protection to the case under
review.139 All of these issues will be discussed in greater depth in the
following sections.140

135. See Knickerbocker, supra note 63 (suggesting that if an investigation reveals
that those acting as foster parents are gay, the state will remove foster children from
the home).
136. Id. (noting that the proposed legislation would specifically prohibit the use of
state funds to purchase textbooks and library materials that “promote”
homosexuality).
137. Id. (quoting Rep. Gerald Allen (R)).
138. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West 2005).
139. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (guaranteeing due process and equal protection
to “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States”); see also Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967) (rejecting the argument that because a statute barring
interracial marriage resulted in equal penalties to all offenders it did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause, and finding that depriving interracial couples of the
fundamental right to marry violated the Due Process Clause because it was a choice
that must be left to individuals).
140. See infra Part II.B-C (discussing the Due Process Clause and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and how they relate to gay
marriage).
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In light of the above, President Bush has argued:
Those who want to change the meaning of marriage claim that [the
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution] requires all states
and cities to recognize same-sex marriage performed anywhere in
America.
. . . [E]ven if the Defense of Marriage Act is upheld, the law does
not protect marriage within any state or city. For all these reasons,
the defense of marriage requires a constitutional amendment.141

Early in 2005, just after Bush’s second presidential campaign
victory, Republican Senator Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-TN)
“promised that Republicans will again seek to approve a constitutional
amendment to ban gay marriage.”142 With his confidence bolstered
by President Bush’s reelection in 2004, Senator Frist declared that “his
party’s members are coming into the [2005] session with the
American people on their side.”143
Republican Congresswoman Marilyn Musgrave of Colorado and five
co-sponsors introduced the first anti-gay marriage Congressional
resolution in May of 2003.144 In that same year, Republican Wayne
Allard of Colorado introduced a companion resolution in the
Senate.145 Both resolutions provided that: “Marriage in the United
States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman. Neither
this Constitution, nor the Constitution of any State, nor State or
Federal law, shall be construed to require that marital status or the
legal incidents thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or
groups.”146
However, because the requirements for passing a U.S.
Constitutional Amendment are extremely rigorous, the chance for
passage of the resolutions is slim.147 First, such an amendment
141. Same-sex Marriage: Bush’s Remarks on Marriage Amendment, supra note
120.
142. See Rick Klein, Senate Democrats Coordinate Message, Attack on Bush,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 25, 2005, available at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/
washington/articles/2005/01/25/senate_democrats_coordinate_message_attack_on
_bush/ (highlighting the priorities of both Democratic and Republican leaders of the
Senate for the year, and noting that in 2004 supporters of a constitutional
amendment came up nineteen votes short of moving forward in the Senate).
143. See id. (noting that Senator Frist also appealed to Democratic Senators to
acknowledge the support Republicans received when seeking compromises).
144. See H.R.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003) (using the increasing power of the
Republican Party to introduce the constitutional amendment defining marriage as
between a man and a woman).
145. See S.J. Res. 26, 108th Cong. (2003) (echoing the House Resolution calling
for an anti-gay marriage constitutional amendment).
146. S.J. Res. 26.; H.R.J. Res. 56.
147. See Sheldon Alberts, Bush Bid to Ban Gay Marriage is Just Talk, NATIONAL
POST, Feb. 27, 2004, at A10 (pointing out that since the adoption of the U.S.
Constitution in 1787, legislators have amended it twenty-seven times but have failed
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requires support from two-thirds of both the House of Representatives
and the Senate, as well as three-fourths of the States.148 Second, it is
not clear that either President Bush or Senator Frist will be able to get
the level of support needed from their own party members to pass an
amendment. Republican party members’ stance cannot easily be
identified. For instance, Montana Senator Conrad Burns has said that
“he is ‘very cool to the idea of an amendment’ because he opposes
government intervention in family matters.”149 Other Republicans,
including California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, also have
refused to support the proposed amendment, because they are “loath
to support a federal initiative that treads on their jurisdiction to
legislate family relationships.”150
In the absence of a constitutional amendment, the future of gay
marriage rests in the hands of the courts. In 2005 alone there were a
series of conflicting rulings addressing this issue in different state
courts around the country.151 On one coast a New York state court
judge decided that the New York Constitution’s Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses were not violated when a same sex couple was
prevented from marrying,152 while on the other coast the Oregon
Supreme Court ruled that a gay marriage was not valid because it
violated Oregon’s DOMA153 and a California court decided that the
State’s new law limiting marriage to heterosexuals was valid under
California law.154
Any state law or court decision that gives rise to issues covered by
the U.S. Constitution, however, is subject to review in the federal
court system and can ultimately lead to a case being heard by the U.S.
on more than eleven thousand occasions).
148. See U.S. CONST. art. V (requiring that “whenever two thirds of both Houses
deem it necessary . . . when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several
States,” the Constitution may be amended); see also Marriage/Relationship Laws:
State by State, supra note 15 (noting that forty states currently ban gay marriage).
149. Alberts, supra note 147 (quoting Senator Conrad Burns).
150. Id.
151. Compare Seymour v. Holcomb, 790 N.Y.S.2d 858, 861 (2005) (finding no
constitutional right to gay marriage under the New York Constitution), and Li v.
State, 110 P.3d 91, 102 (Or. 2005) (finding Oregon can properly limit marriage to
only between a man and woman), with Knight v. Super. Ct. of Sacramento County, 26
Cal.Rptr.3d 687, 687 (Ct. App. 2005) (finding that a domestic partnership provision
did not violate the California Constitution).
152. See Seymour, 790 N.Y.S.2d at 866 (noting that the decision to extend
marriage to gay couples must be made by the legislature, not the courts).
153. See Li, 110 P.3d at 102 (finding that a county lacked the authority to issue
marriage licenses to same sex couples, rendering all such marriage licenses void).
154. See Knight, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d at 699 (describing the differences between the
rights enjoyed by married couples and the rights granted to couples in domestic
partnerships, including the inability of domestic partners to file joint tax returns or to
receive many government benefits).
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Supreme Court.155 There are a host of constitutional provisions that
are triggered by these decisions, all of which will be examined in the
next section.156
II. THE TENTH AMENDMENT AND STATES’ RIGHT TO REGULATE
MARRIAGE VS. THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
A. The Tenth Amendment and State Police Powers
It is not possible to talk about how the federal courts will resolve the
gay marriage debate without first examining the Tenth Amendment
to the Constitution, which provides: “The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”157 The
powers referred to in the Tenth Amendment are commonly referred
to as the state’s “police powers,” which include “[t]he power to make
any and all laws deemed necessary for the protection of the public
health, safety, welfare, and morals.”158 Generally, courts have ruled
that the Tenth Amendment grants states the right to regulate
marriages that take place within their borders.159
As mentioned previously, pro-DOMA advocates believe that state
enacted DOMAs can be justified on Tenth Amendment grounds
because, in their view, homosexuality in general, and gay marriage in
particular, are immoral.160 They believe states should therefore have
the right to regulate this kind of conduct vis-a-vis states’ police powers.
State laws restricting marriage, however, must also not be in conflict
with the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution.161 The extent to which the courts
have used the Fourteenth Amendment to place boundaries around
155. See SUP. CT. R. 10 (providing that the United States Supreme Court has
jurisdiction over controversies that have resulted in conflicting decisions from federal
courts of appeals, conflicting decisions from state courts of last resort, or that involve
an important question of federal law that remains unsettled).
156. See infra Part II.A-C (discussing the Tenth Amendment, Due Process Clause
and Equal Protection Clause as they relate to gay marriage).
157. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
158. OTIS H. STEPHENS, JR. & JOHN M. SCHEB II, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 94
(2d ed. 1999).
159. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (Mass.
2003) (stating that “civil marriage is created and regulated through exercise of the
police power”).
160. See, e.g., Southern Baptist Convention, supra note 119 (declaring that gay
marriage goes against God’s laws).
161. See, e.g., Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 968 (finding that a prohibition on gay
marriage violated the Fourteenth Amendment and produced “a deep and scarring
hardship on a very real segment of the community for no rational reason”).
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states’ police powers with respect to marriage will be discussed next.
B. The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses
Passed by Congress during the racially and politically tumultuous
years following the end of the Civil War in 1868, the Fourteenth
Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law
which shall . . . deprive any person life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.”162 Although the Amendment is written
in broad, racially neutral terms, it was initially intended to protect the
rights of newly freed slaves, most of whom were prevented from
participating fully as citizens by whites who found the prospect of
black liberty and equality threatening to their way of life.163 There is
therefore a long tradition of legal jurisprudence in which the courts
have used the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down laws and
policies that attempted to promote racial discrimination.164 Over the
last 140 years, however, there has also been a steady and continuous
trend in the courts to allow the Fourteenth Amendment to be used to
overturn laws and policies that have nothing to do with race or the
rights of the descendants of slaves.165 This in turn has allowed gay
rights advocates to lay claim to the Fourteenth Amendment’s
promises, especially in the area of marriage rights.
In the 1967 case Loving v. Virginia, the Supreme Court used the
Fourteenth Amendment to overturn a Virginia state antimiscegenation law that made it a crime for African-Americans and
whites to marry.166
1. Loving v. Virginia
The plaintiffs in Loving were a black woman and her white
husband.167 Originally residents of Virginia, they left the State in
162. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
163. See Toni Lester, Context, Contention and the Constitution: Riding the Waves
of the Affirmative Action Debate, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 67 (2005) (discussing the
original intent of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the challenges to black equality in
the years following the Civil War).
164. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (striking down Virginia’s
anti-miscegenation statute as “directly subversive to the principle of equality at the
heart of the Fourteenth Amendment”).
165. See Lester, supra note 163.
166. See 388 U.S. at 2 (distinguishing between statutes based on racial
classifications and those based on other distinctions, and holding that the statutes
based on racial classifications were subject to much more rigorous scrutiny because
they had no rational basis).
167. See id. (noting that the plaintiffs that sought to get married were Mildred
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1958 to marry in the District of Columbia, where it was legal for them
to do so.168 They then returned to Virginia, whereupon they were
tried and convicted under Section 20-58 of the state criminal code,
which stated:
If any white person and colored person shall go out of this State, for
the purpose of being married, and with the intention of returning,
and be married out of it, and afterwards return to and reside in it,
cohabiting as man and wife, they shall be punished . . . and the
marriage shall be governed by the same law as if it had been
solemnized in this State.169

At the time of the ruling, there were sixteen states in the U.S. that
outlawed interracial marriage, including Delaware, Tennessee and
Alabama, and fourteen states that had repealed such laws.170 The
California Supreme Court was the first court to declare such laws
illegal under the Equal Protection clause in the 1948 case, Perez v.
Sharp.171
The Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the Lovings’ convictions,
finding that the State had a legitimate interest in preserving “the
racial integrity of its citizens, . . . [preventing] the corruption of blood
. . . and the obliteration of racial pride.”172 The Virginia Court also
ruled that the states have an exclusive right under the Tenth
Amendment to regulate marriage within their boundaries. 173 The
U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine if these
assertions were correct.174
Delivering the opinion for the U.S. Supreme Court, Chief Justice
Warren said that the Virginia law violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, notwithstanding
the fact that it penalized whites and blacks equally.175 Because the
Jeter, a black woman, and Richard Loving, a white man).
168. See id. at 2-3 (stating that after their convictions in Virginia, the Lovings
returned to the District of Columbia because the laws in the District allowed them to
live together as man and wife, while in Virginia living together was a legal basis for a
presumption that they were married, and therefore in violation of Virginia’s laws).
169. Id. at 4 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 20-58 (Michie 1960) (repealed 1967)).
170. See id. at 6 (noting that the initiation of litigation in this case compelled
Maryland to repeal its statute barring interracial marriages).
171. See 198 P.2d 17, 29 (Cal. 1948) (holding that the California statutes
arbitrarily and unreasonably discriminated against certain racial groups).
172. Loving, 388 U.S. at 7 (quoting Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955)).
173. See id. (noting that although the State claimed the power to regulate
marriage, it did not argue that the power to regulate marriage was unlimited in light
of the Fourteenth Amendment).
174. See id. at 2 (noting that the case presented a constitutional question never
addressed by the Court of whether a state statute barring interracial marriage violated
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment).
175. See id. at 12 (holding that depriving citizens of the fundamental right to
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state statute involved racial classifications, Warren observed that it was
not exempt “from the very heavy burden of justification which the
Fourteenth Amendment has traditionally required of state statutes
drawn according to race.”176 Countering arguments made by the
State that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment never intended
for it to eliminate anti-miscegenation laws, Warren declared that
“[w]hile these statements have some relevance to the intention of
Congress in submitting the Fourteenth Amendment, it must be
understood that they . . . [do not pertain] to the broader, organic
purpose of a constitutional amendment.”177 Warren also noted that
racial discrimination of the type covered in the Virginia statute had to
be subjected to the “most rigid scrutiny,”178 and unless there was a
separate and distinct, permissible, objective reason for the
discrimination, laws furthering it could not stand.179 He declared
that “[t]here is patently no legitimate overriding purpose
independent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies this
classification . . . . [Its sole purpose is] to maintain White
Supremacy.”180
Justice Warren also decided that the Virginia law was
unconstitutional because it violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment: “The freedom to marry has long been
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men.”181 As such, he argued that
“[m]arriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to
our very existence and survival.”182 “To deny this fundamental
freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications
embodied in these statutes,” he said, “is surely to deprive all the
State’s citizens of liberty without due process of law.”183 Thus, he
concluded, it is the individual, not the state, that has the right to
decide if they are going to marry a person of another race.184
marry based on racial distinctions was “directly subversive of the principle of equality
at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment”).
176. Id. at 9.
177. Id. (emphasis added).
178. Id. at 11 (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)).
179. See id. (noting that the Supreme Court had already declared that there is no
valid legislative purpose for using the color of a person’s skin as the test for
criminality).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 12.
182. Id. (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
183. Id.
184. See id. (invalidating the state’s statutory scheme restricting interracial
marriage and mandating that white persons only marry other white persons on the
basis that such restrictions violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
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The Loving decision is extremely important to the gay marriage
issue for the following reasons. First, the Court ruled that the right to
marry is a fundamental right guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.185
Second, Justice Warren made it clear that religion should not play a
role in the development of laws designed to discriminate based on
race.186 Also, while he recognized that states do have the right to
manage the morality and welfare of their residents in such areas as
marriage, he said that this is not an exclusive right.187 Finally, Warren
outlined the standard of review that should be used in Fourteenth
amendment cases where racial discrimination is the chief motivating
force behind a government law or policy.188 That standard, which
Warren refers to as the “rigid scrutiny” standard, is today called the
“strict scrutiny test.”189
C. Standards of Review in Fourteenth Amendment Cases and
Disputes About Which Standard to Apply to Sexual Orientation
Claims
Generally, there are three levels of review that courts use to
determine equal protection issues.190 The strict scrutiny test is
considered the most rigorous test of the three.191 The test relates to
the proposition that some kinds of discrimination are inherently
suspect, such as discrimination based on religion, race, ethnicity or
fundamental rights like the right the right to privacy.192 It requires
Constitution).
185. See id. (holding that “[m]arriage is one of the basic civil rights of man,
fundamental to our very existence”).
186. See id.
187. See id. at 7 (stating that the state’s power in the Tenth Amendment to
regulate marriage is limited by the proscriptions of Fourteenth Amendment).
188. See id. at 11 (holding that rigid scrutiny must be used when racial
classifications are made in criminal statutes).
189. See id. (finding that rigid scrutiny demands that the statute “must be shown to
be necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible state objective, independent
of the racial discrimination which it was the object of the Fourteenth Amendment to
eliminate”).
190. See STEPHENS & SCHEB, supra note 158, at 739-41 (explaining that the three
tests courts use in equal protection cases, rational basis, strict scrutiny, and
heightened scrutiny, to determine a statute or action’s constitutional validity vary in
terms of scrutiny levels and shifting burdens of proof, with the rational basis test
providing the easiest test for a statute or state action to pass, and strict scrutiny
providing a more difficult test).
191. See id. at 739-40 (describing the strict scrutiny test as difficult, if not
impossible, for the government to satisfy because it removes the statute’s presumption
of constitutionality, shifts the burden of proof to the government, and requires the
government to show that it has a compelling interest for ethnic discrimination).
192. See id. (outlining the historical development of the strict scrutiny test and
explaining that the test shifts the burden of proof to the government or state to show
that the statute or policy in question serves some sort of compelling interest); see also
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courts to overturn government laws or policies that discriminate on
these grounds unless it can be shown that there is a sufficiently
compelling government interest in furthering those laws or policies,
and that the means used to advance that interest are narrowly
tailored.193 In addition to Loving, a long line of cases have reinforced
the notion that the strict scrutiny test should be applied to state and
federal laws and policies that discriminate against people on racial
grounds.194
In addition to the strict scrutiny test, courts employ two other tests
in Fourteenth Amendment cases. The second most rigorous test,
called the intermediate or heightened scrutiny test, requires that the
government show “that a challenged policy bears a ‘substantial’
relationship to an ‘important’ government interest.”195 Courts have
ruled that the heightened scrutiny analysis is the test that should be
applied to sex discrimination cases.196 The least rigorous test, called
the “rational basis test,”197 allows courts to uphold laws if those laws
are supported by a legitimate government purpose and the means
used to accomplish that purpose are rationally related to it.198 The
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (stating that “if a law neither burdens a
fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative
classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end) (citing
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-320 (1993)).
193. See STEPHENS & SCHEB, supra note 158, at 739-40 (describing the courts’ duty
to subject any statute or state action that discriminates on the basis of race to the most
rigid scrutiny, as set forth in Korematsu v. Untited States, and explaining that courts
must hold the government to a very high burden of proof to show that its statute or
action is valid).
194. See, e.g., Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (striking
down a city ordinance that awarded a certain percentage of public contracts to
minority contractors only because it excluded other non-minority business owners
from consideration for some public contracts on the basis of race); Adarand
Construction v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237-239 (1995) (maintaining that government
statutes and actions involving racial classification are still subject to strict scrutiny
analysis, stressing the importance of narrowly tailoring any such statutes that serve a
compelling government interest, and remanding the case to lower court so that the
court could apply the strict scrutiny test to a federal program that awarded contracts
to disadvantaged businesses).
195. STEPHENS & SCHEB, supra note 158, at 741.
196. See Sidney Buchanan, Affirmative Action: The Many Shades of Justice, 39
HOUS. L. REV. 149, 157-58 (2002) (comparing the tests that courts use to assess the
constitutionality of racially and gender based affirmative action programs and laws,
and noting that courts have normally considered gender inequality to be an
“important” interest justifying legislation that distinguishes between men and women,
whereas they have been less willing to classify the government’s use of racial
classifications in the same way) (citing Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977)).
197. STEPHENS & SCHEB, supra note 158, at 739.
198. See id. (explaining that the rationale basis reflected a more conservative
activism in the Supreme Court in the first half of the twentieth century, and thus, the
test is usually a lesser standard for the government to satisfy when parties challenge its
legislation or action’s constitutionality, but its application is limited to certain types of
constitutional challenges, usually not involving racial classification).
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rational basis test is the primary standard of review in cases involving
business regulation.199 Cases “under rational basis review normally
pass constitutional muster, since ‘the Constitution presumes that even
improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic
processes.’”200
The above three tiers of review largely exist to accommodate
competing claims that have emerged since the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. Because the amendment was
initially enacted to level the playing field for freed African-American
slaves and their descendants denied basic civil rights and liberties after
the end of the Civil War, “[t]he first step in . . . [any Fourteenth
Amendment] analysis is to categorize the class affected as more or less
similar to race based on certain judicially-developed criteria.”201
Claimants hoping to get suspect class protection are thus evaluated in
order to see if they were subjected to “historical discrimination,
political powerlessness . . . [or if they have] immutable characteristics
[akin to race] . . . . In addition to race (the original suspect class),
alienage and national origin have also been recognized as suspect.”202
As mentioned above, the mid-tier standard of review is reserved for
classifications based on gender. The balance is usually left for almost
all business regulation, which, as also stated previously, “[is]
presumptively constitutional and will be upheld if rationally related to
any conceivable, legitimate government interest.”203
The question of what test should be applied to sexual orientation
discrimination claims, however, has been the subject if much dispute
in the courts. Is sexual orientation discrimination similar to race and
thus deserving of strict scrutiny treatment? Or should it be subject to
199. See id. (citing the example of a state regulation requiring medical licenses for
psychiatrists to serve the legitimate state interest of protecting public health and safety
as illustrative of the way in which a court might apply the rational basis test to
legislation aimed at a certain class of persons).
200. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579-80 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(citing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)).
201. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 871 (Vt. 1999) (citing Personnel Administrator
of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979)); see also JUDITH A. BAER, EQUALITY
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION: RECLAIMING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 253-64 (1983)
(concluding that the question of whether a classification is similar to race is the
wrong kind of analysis to be undertaken when doing an Equal Protection Clause test);
Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2441-44 (1994)
(comparing suspect classifications to the anti-caste principle, which aims to prevent
second-class status for various groups in society, and noting that under both
principles, courts consider such factors as political power, immutable characteristics,
and discrimination history to determine if a class is entitled to protection from
suspect legislation, but recognizing the definitional problems that courts have when
they try to define and analyze these factors, and that the analysis under the anti-caste
principle may yield different results from the suspect classification analysis).
202. Baker, 744 A.2d at 871 (citing Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41).
203. Id. (citing Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981)).
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the less taxing standards associated with sex discrimination or
economic discrimination, respectively? In the 1997 case, Equality
Foundation v. City of Cincinnati,204 a federal appeals court ruled that
since homosexual conduct was legally criminal at the time, gays could
not claim suspect class status.205 But in the 1998 case, Tanner v.
Oregon Health Sciences University,206 the Oregon Court of Appeals
declared that gays were a suspect class because they were a socially
recognized group that was the target of negative political and social
stereotyping and prejudice.207 Thus, the Oregon court concluded
that a government employer’s practice of denying health insurance
benefits to heterosexual married couples, but not gay couples, was
unconstitutional under Oregon state law.208
I have argued elsewhere that that sexual orientation discrimination
is much like sex discrimination because homophobia is largely
motivated by a desire to punish gay people for failing to conform to
traditional stereotypes about how men and women are supposed to
behave.209 As my analysis in Part I showed, outdated, religiously
inspired notions about the proper roles that men and women should
play in and outside of marriage all surface in arguments made by proDOMA advocates.210 The natural state for men and women is
heterosexuality, the argument goes. Marriage, procreation and

204. 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997).
205. See id. at 292-93 (rejecting the heightened scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny
tests for constitutional validity of legislation in analyzing a city ordinance that
removed sexual orientation from a statute defining protected classes, because the
court did not believe that homosexuality was a suspect or quasi-suspect class).
206. 971 P.2d 435 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
207. See id. at 447 (denying that the University’s policy that homosexual
employees could not receive health benefits for their domestic partners violated a
state statute, but holding that the policy violated the Oregon Constitution because
homosexuals were a “suspect class,” and therefore, policies aimed at or affecting this
class differently must be subject to strict scrutiny).
208. See id. (reasoning that the University’s policy violated constitutional
principles because homosexuals were a distinct social class which had been
discriminated against socially and politically, and because Oregon did not have a valid
reason to justify providing benefits for heterosexual married couples, but not
domestic partners).
209. See generally Toni Lester, Protecting the Gender Nonconformist from the
Gender Police: Why the Harassment of Gays and Other Gender Nonconformists Is a
Form of Sex Discrimination in Light of the Supreme Court’s Decision in Oncale v.
Sundowner, 29 N.M. L. REV. 89 (1999) (explaining the connection between
stereotypes about gender and identity and discrimination against homosexuals in
society and advocating that those in the legal profession use this connection to better
argue for increased protection for homosexual rights in harassment and
discrimination cases).
210. See infra Part I (defining the varying definitions and conceptions of marriage,
such as the difference between legal and religious definitions of marriage, and the
difference between older concepts of marriage as more of a “mercenary” relationship
and more modern concepts that see marriage as more of a romantic union).
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raising children should be the ultimate desire of all heterosexuals.
Under this line of reasoning, gay people are traitors to their biological
sex, a perversion in the eyes of God. Because homophobia has its
roots in this kind of sexist thinking and reasoning, right to marry
claims should be subjected to the heightened scrutiny test normally
used in sex discrimination cases. Under the heightened scrutiny test,
it would be very hard for a state DOMA to withstand constitutional
attack, since, as the discussion below will show, none of the typical
reasons offered by states to justify the passage of DOMAs (i.e.,
preservation of the tradition, safeguarding morality, and protecting
children from gay parents) sufficiently articulates an important or
provable government interest worth preserving. The U.S. Supreme
Court took up this issue in the 1996 case, Romer v. Evans.211
1. Romer v. Evans and the Court’s Use of the Rational Basis Test for
Sexual Orientation
The Supreme Court had to decide in Romer which of the above
tests to apply in a case involving government based sexual orientation
discrimination.212 In the early 1990s, certain Colorado cities like
Boulder and Denver enacted laws that prohibited various forms of
discrimination against gays, lesbians, and bisexuals.213 For example,
the City of Boulder passed a law that prevented such discrimination in
“any place of business engaged in any sales to the general public and
any place that offers services, facilities, privileges, or advantages to the
general public or that receives financial support through solicitation
of the general public or through governmental subsidy of any
kind.”214 In response to these developments, the citizens of Colorado
passed a statewide referendum in 1992 amending the state
constitution.215 The amendment prevented any kind of “legislative,
executive or judicial action at any level of state or local government
designed to protect” gays, bisexuals and lesbians from ever being

211. See 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (evaluating a Colorado constitutional
amendment that would prohibit the state executive, legislator, or courts from
enacting laws or taking action that aimed to protect homosexuals from
discrimination, and concluding after applying a rational basis test, that the state did
not have a legitimate interest that was rationally related to this legislation).
212. See id. at 634-35 (deciding that the standard to be used is that a law must have
a rational basis to the legitimate government interest that it looks to further).
213. See id. at 623 (stating that these statutes looked to end “discrimination in
many transactions and activities, including housing, employment, education, public
accommodations, and health and welfare services”).
214. Id. at 628 (citing BOULDER REV. CODE § 12-1-1(j) (1987)).
215. See id. at 623 (stating that the citizens of Colorado voted to adopt
Amendment 2 in response to the municipal ordinances).
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passed.216 It made illegal any law or policy “whereby homosexual,
lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships
shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or
class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota
preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination.”217
Several gay claimants challenged the amendment in court on the
grounds that it would subject them to the risk of discrimination and
leave them without any recourse.218 Laws in place at the time that the
amendment would negate included the governor’s executive order
prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination against state
government workers,219 and government policies outlawing sexual
orientation discrimination on state college campuses.220 The state
argued that the new constitutional amendment was legal because it
simply put gays on the same level playing ground as everyone else, by
not granting them special rights.221
Writing for the majority of the Court, Justice Kennedy disagreed:
The amendment imposes a special disability upon . . . [gays] alone .
. . . Homosexuals are forbidden the safeguards that others enjoy or
may seek without constraint . . . . This is so no matter how local or
discrete the harm, no matter how public and widespread the injury
. . . these are protections against exclusion from an almost limitless
number of transactions and endeavors that constitute ordinary civic
life in a free society.222

Furthermore, he noted, the amendment’s “sheer breadth is so
discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment
seems inexplicable by anything butanimus toward the class it affects; it

216. See id. at 624 (citing the text of the amendment, and noting that its intended
and practical effect would be to not only repeal the existing ordinances that define
homosexuals and bisexuals as a protected class, but also to prevent future legislation
or judicial decisions that would do the same).
217. See id. (citing COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b).
218. See id. at 625 (outlining the plaintiffs’ argument that the amendment would
put them at a “substantial risk “for discrimination and that the amendment would
repeal additional laws not mentioned in the amendment).
219. See id. at 629 (citing Colo. Exec. Order No. D0035 (Dec. 10, 1990))
(explaining that the state executive order prohibited “employment discrimination for
‘all state employees, classified and exempt’ on the basis of sexual orientation”).
220. See id. (highlighting the fact that the amendment would affect not only
legislation protecting gay, lesbian, and bisexual people, but also, would prohibit such
protection through policies, as the amendment also repealed state college policies
that protected homosexuals as a class from discrimination).
221. See id. at 626 (contrasting the state’s argument that the amendment only
denies special treatment for gays, lesbians, and bisexuals, rather than denying specific
rights, with the state court’s interpretation of the amendment as aimed at legislation
involving homosexual rights only).
222. Id. at 631.
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lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests.”223 With
respect to this last point, Kennedy observed that he could see no
legitimate reason for such a law to be passed except for homosexual
animus.224 As such, he concluded, “a bare . . . desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest.”225
Aside from two earlier cases in which the Court struck down laws
making gay magazines per se obscene and therefore not shippable by
U.S. mail,226 the Romer case marks the first time the U.S. Supreme
Court outlawed the practice of targeting gays for discrimination just
because they are gay. As the language used by Justice Kennedy also
suggests, the Court applied the rational basis test to determine that
the Colorado amendment was unconstitutional.227 Laws making it
harder for one group of citizens to seek help from the government, as
opposed to others, are contrary to the Fourteenth amendment’s equal
protection clause,228 Kennedy explains, because “central both to the
idea of the rule of law and to our own Constitution’s guarantee of
equal protection is the principle that government and each of its parts
remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance.”229
Kennedy’s decision in Romer should be applauded for its pro-gay
stance. However, because he used the rational basis test to overturn
the Colorado law, as opposed to the heightened scrutiny test, it was
also possible at the time to think that states still had some leeway to
enact other kinds of laws that discriminated against gays, as long as
those laws were designed to support newly articulated interests that
made sense to the Court. As it turned out, Kennedy was not willing to
223. Id. at 632 (emphasis added).
224. See id. (reasoning that an amendment that is so broad and imposes burdens
on one group, homosexuals, “defies,” rather than fails, the requirements of
Constitutional analysis).
225. Id. at 634-35 (quoting Dep’t of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534
(1973)).
226. See One, Inc. v. Olesen, 241 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1957) (holding that a
magazine that promoted homosexuality and lesbianism was not mailable), rev’d, 355
U.S. 371 (1958); Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962) (reversing the
lower court decision that determined certain magazines with semi-nude male models
and possibly advertising obscene material were a violation of a federal statute
prohibiting people from mailing such materials because the magazines did not fall
under the Court’s definition of obscenity).
227. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631-32 (applying the rational basis test to the
amendment in question and concluding that there is no way in which a statute that is
so broad in scope and targets a particular group could rationally serve a legitimate
state purpose).
228. See id. at 633 (explaining that such laws violate the group members’ equal
protection rights, as did the Colorado amendment in this case when it precluded gays
specifically from government protections).
229. Id.
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entertain such interests in the next gay rights case to come before the
Court, Lawrence v. Texas, and he essentially took up where he left off
in Romer, continuing his use of the rational basis test to overturn
Texas’ anti-sodomy laws.230
2. Lawrence v. Texas
In Lawrence, the Houston police arrested two adult men, John
Geddes Lawrence and Tyron Garner, when the police entered
Lawrence’s home and found the two men having consensual sex.231
The state convicted the two men under a Texas state statute, making it
a crime for two people of the same sex to engage in “deviate sexual
intercourse.”232 Deviate sexual intercourse was defined as “any
contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth
or anus of another person; or . . . the penetration of the genitals or
the anus of another person with an object.”233
Justice Kennedy, delivering the opinion for the majority, said that
there were three issues in dispute: 1) whether the statute violated the
plaintiffs’ rights under the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of
equal protection; 2) whether the statute violated the plaintiffs’ rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of due process; and
3) whether or not Bowers v. Harwick,234 the 1986 Supreme Court case
upholding Georgia’s anti-sodomy law, should be overturned.235 In
Bowers, the Court let stand a Georgia statute that made it a crime for
both heterosexuals and gay people to engage in sodomy.236
230. See 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (acknowledging that the Equal Protection
Clause analysis could be relevant to determining if a Texas criminal statute
prohibiting homosexual sodomy was constitutionally invalid, but ultimately declining
to expand Romer, and requiring that the government show a substantial interest in
prohibiting sodomy).
231. See id. at 562 (stating that the police were called to the home in response to a
purported claim of weapons being fired).
232. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (Vernon 2005), declared
unconstitutional by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (prohibiting deviate sexual intercourse
between members of the same sex and noting that violators are subject to a Class C
misdemeanor).
233. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.01(1).
234. See 48 U.S. 186 (1986) (rejecting plaintiff’s claim that a state statute
prohibiting sodomy was unconstitutional and denying that the Due Process Clause
provided a right to engage in homosexual sodomy).
235. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564 (outlining the possible questions the court
could answer in the case, including whether or not the statute violates Due Process or
Equal Protection Clauses, and whether the Court should overturn the Bowers
decision, and ultimately concluding that the Court could decide the case on due
process grounds).
236. See Bowers, 48 U.S. at 189 (reversing the lower court’s decision that the
plaintiff’s due process rights were violated when he was not allowed to engage in
sodomy because it interfered with his privacy and association rights, and holding that
the Georgia statute was valid).
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Justice Kennedy, who was joined in his opinion by Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, ruled that the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth
Amendment due process liberty rights were infringed upon when they
were arrested.237 Justice Kennedy states:
[A]dults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines
of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their
dignity as free persons. When sexuality finds overt expression in
intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one
element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty
protected by the [Due Process Clause of the] Constitution allows
homosexual persons the right to make this choice.238

Justice Kennedy also said that Bowers should be overturned because
it is not good law now nor was it good law at the time it was
decided.239 Our stare decisis system requires judges to grant great
deference to precedent because society has a right to rely on the
stability that judicial decisions produce, he noted.240 Furthermore, of
the nine states that had anti-sodomy laws on the books before Bowers
was decided, many failed to enforce those laws and many abolished
them altogether after the decision was rendered, and, thus, he said,
the stability argument had no weight.241 Furthermore, although the
majority court in Bowers said that there was ample evidence to
support the proposition that homosexuality has always been a crime
in America, Justice Kennedy noted that more recent historical
scholarship in this area contradicts that assertion.242 Finally, and most
237. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (contrasting the consensual conduct between
two adults that the petitioners engaged in, with the type of conduct that might justify
government interference, such as prostitution or child abuse, and holding that the
statute in question violated the petitioner’s due process liberty rights to privacy).
238. Id. at 567.
239. See id. at 577-78 (stating that “there has been no individual or societal
reliance on Bowers of the sort that could counsel against overturning its holding once
there are compelling reasons to do so. Bowers itself causes uncertainty, for the
precedents before and after its issuance contradicts its central holding.”). It is also
important to note that Bowers involved a law that made same sex and opposite sex
sodomy a crime, although the law tended to be targeted only against gays, whereas
the law under review in Lawrence only targeted same sex behavior. Id. at 566.
240. See id. at 577 (acknowledging that stare decisis requires the Court’s respect,
but noting that it is not an unlimited principle, and therefore, if there is compelling
interest for overturning a decision or if a decision infringes on constitutional liberties,
the Court may overturn it).
241. See id. at 570-71 (comparing states’ approaches to sodomy laws, including
Oklahoma and Texas, that criminalize sodomy and enforce anti-sodomy statutes, with
other states such as Tennessee and Montana that have moved to abolish their sodomy
laws, and with Georgia, which has a sodomy law but chooses not to enforce it).
242. See id. at 576 (reasoning that the fact that many scholars and others have
criticized the decision in Bowers, combined with the fact that many states have chosen
not to follow it as precedent because they believe it violates homosexuals’
constitutional rights, demonstrates that it is not a given consensus that homosexuality
has always been a crime in the United States) (citing C. FRIED, ORDER AND LAW:
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importantly, Justice Kennedy said that Bowers needed to be
overturned because he did not want to leave people with the
impression that an anti-sodomy statute that targeted both gays and
heterosexuals was constitutional under the equal protection clause
because it treated similarly situated people the same.243
Justice Kennedy eloquently articulated a host of reasons for his
ruling in Lawrence.244 His rationale reads like a history lesson in the
jurisprudence of privacy rights, equal protection and due process law,
especially as these three areas of constitutional law relate to a person’s
right to autonomy over their own body and sexuality.245 Four
particular cases that Kennedy used to bolster his conclusions were
Griswold v. Connecticut,246 Eisenstadt v. Baird,247 Carey v. Population
Services International,248 and Roe v. Wade.249
Griswold involved a challenge to a Connecticut state statute that
made it a crime punishable by sixty days in jail for anyone who used
ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION: A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT
AND REASON 341-50 (1992)).

81-84 (1991); R. POSER, SEX

243. See id. at 574-75 (explaining that if the Court were to use the Equal
Protection Clause to invalidate the decision in Bowers or the Texas statute, states
might be able to circumvent the protection by including more classes of people
under an anti-sodomy statute, and that this risk was not worth taking when the Court
could invalidate both the case and the statute using the Due Process Clause, which
furthers many of the same equal protection interests).
244. See id. at 564-67 (elaborating on several bases for the Court’s decision to
overturn Bowers and invalidate the Texas statute, including several substantive rights
arising from due process rights, equal protection interests, and historical evidence
that runs contrary to the idea that sodomy is a crime in the United States).
245. See id. (discussing the various rights that the Court has used over the past half
century to invalidate state actions or legislation that violates due process rights,
including substantive individual rights to privacy, spatial integrity and control over
one’s own body, and privacy and freedom within marital and other intimate
relationships, and noting that these interests are similar to those involved in
homosexual relationships including the rights to privacy and control over one’s own
body, and privacy in a consensual adult relationship).
246. See id. at 564-65 (noting that the Court in Griswold invalidated a state statute
prohibiting the use of birth control, as well as aiding and abetting others using birth
control, because it violated due process rights by infringing on privacy rights, and
explaining that the decision was relevant to the analysis in Lawrence because it
involved privacy in intimate relationships) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 485 (1965)).
247. See 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (invalidating a state statute that prohibited the sale
and distribution of contraceptives to non-married people without authorization
because the Court could not find a reasonable purpose for distinguishing nonmarried from married people in the statute, and thus, that the statute violated the
equal protection clause).
248. See 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (holding that a state statute restricting birth control
sales to people over sixteen and only by licensed pharmacists or physicians was
unconstitutional because it burdened an individual’s right to make a decision about
his or her own reproduction without serving a compelling government interest).
249. See 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (striking down a state statute prohibiting abortion on
the grounds that it interfered with a woman’s personal liberty as guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment without serving a compelling interest).
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contraceptives or for doctors who proscribed contraceptives or
counseled people on their use.250 One of the plaintiffs was a doctor
who had given medical advice to married women on how to protect
against getting pregnant, and was convicted under the statute.251
Justice Douglas wrote the opinion for the Court.252 Key to the
question of whether or not the law was unconstitutional, he observed,
was how it should interpret the meaning of the Fourth Amendment’s
mandate that people have a right to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures conducted by the government, as well as the First
Amendment’s free association guarantees and the Third
Amendment’s prohibitions against the housing of soldiers in private
homes during peacetime.253 All of these amendments, said Douglas,
create a series of “penumbral rights of privacy and repose,”254 which
in turn produce a “zone of privacy,”255 on which married couples
should be able to rely. He asked, “Would we allow the police to
search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of
the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of
privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.”256
Justice Goldberg, in his concurrence, used the strict scrutiny test to
determine the constitutionality of the Connecticut law.257 He said
that the state’s excuse that the law was designed to regulate extramarital relations was not compelling enough to justify its
enforcement.258 The case also made some pronouncements about

250. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-32 (West 1958) (repealed 1971) (prohibiting
the use of contraceptives and providing for penalties for violations of this rule).
251. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480 (asserting that the appellant was a “licensed
physician and a professor at the Yale Medical School who served as Medical Director
for the [Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut]”).
252. See id. at 480-86 (stating that three other Justices concurred with Justice
Douglas, two other Justices concurred in judgment, and two Justices dissented).
253. See id. at 484-85 (defining the various rights that derive from Constitutional
Amendments and explaining that the right claimed in this case, the right to use birth
control without interference from the state, derives from the concept of privacy,
which is implied in the guarantees of the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth
Amendments).
254. Id. at 485 (dictating that the existence of these penumbras is made evident by
the many controversies in which the Court has adjudicated the right to privacy).
255. Id. at 484.
256. Id. at 485-86.
257. See id. at 497 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (finding the right to privacy in the
Constitution to be a fundamental right and asserting that when a fundamental right
has been abridged by a state, strict scrutiny must apply).
258. See id. at 497-98 (Goldberg. J., concurring) (declaring that Connecticut
merely asserted a rational relation between the statute and its legitimate state goal
when it stated that “preventing the use of birth-control devices by married persons
helps prevent the indulgence by some in such extra-marital relations”).
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the special nature of marriage that have particular significance to the
gay marriage issue:
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully
enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an
association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in
living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or
social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any
involved in our prior decisions.259

Justice Goldberg was not willing to cast his protective net around
gay Americans, however. He distinguished heterosexual marital rights
from the rights of adulteresses and homosexuals to engage in sexual
practices prohibited by the state:
Adultery, homosexuality and the like are sexual intimacies which
the State forbids . . . but the intimacy of husband and wife is
necessarily an essential and accepted feature of the institution of
marriage, an institution which the State not only must allow, but
which always and in every age it has fostered and protected.260

Thus, after Court determined its decision in Griswold, the
government could no longer enter the bedrooms of married
heterosexuals, but single heterosexuals and all homosexuals were still
fair game.
Later decisions rendered in the next decade, however, expanded
on the principles outlined in Griswold, and announced that even
unmarried heterosexuals had a right to the zone of privacy that
Douglas articulated.261 For instance, in the 1972 case, Eisenstadt v.
Baird, the Court ruled on equal protection grounds that state laws
making it illegal for unmarried people to use contraceptives were also
illegal.262 It said, “If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right
of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”263 And in
259. Id. at 486.
260. Id. at 499 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,
553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
261. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447-49 (1972) (rejecting the statute’s
distinction between married and unmarried people, and holding that both categories
enjoyed certain privacy rights free from government interference).
262. See id. at 438 (reasoning that the state’s given purposes for drawing a
distinction between married and unmarried people in the statute, to discourage the
evils of premarital intercourse and preserve the sanctity of the home through selfrestraint, did not meet the lesser, rational basis standard for legislation that interferes
with equal protection claims, let alone a more stringent compelling interest test
because the law was unlikely to achieve its intended deterrent purpose in reality, and
married people could engage in the illicit and immoral behavior the state feared as
well).
263. Id. at 453 (emphasis added).
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the 1977 decision, Carey v. Population Services International, the
Court upheld a New York law that prohibited the sale of
contraceptives to children sixteen years old or younger.264
The decision in the 1973 case Roe v. Wade also demonstrates the
Court’s clear movement towards favoring liberty rights connected to a
person’s sexuality or autonomy over his or her own body.265 In Roe,
the Court declared that a state law making abortion illegal was
unconstitutional because it interfered with a woman’s right “to make
certain fundamental decisions . . . [relating to her liberty interests] . . .
under the Due Process Clause.”266 Roe also made it clear that laws
restricting a woman’s right to have an abortion potentially violate her
constitutional right to privacy.267 The Court then implied that, when
privacy rights such as this were at stake, the strict scrutiny test needs to
be applied to determine if those laws are constitutional or not.268
The Court used strict scrutiny language and said, “Where certain
‘fundamental rights’ are involved, the Court has held that regulation
limiting these rights may be justified only by a ‘compelling state
interest,’”269 and the “legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn
to express only the legitimate state interests at stake.”270
Even though he relied on Griswold, Casey, and Roe, Justice
Kennedy implicitly stated that the proper standard of review in
Lawrence was the rational basis test, not the strict scrutiny test used in
these other cases.271 This is evidenced by the fact that he said that
there was no legitimate state interest that the Texas statute served that
could possibly justify the invasion of privacy envisioned by the law.272
This language is usually associated with the rational basis test.273
264. See 431 U.S. 678, 678-79 (1977) (finding that the New York law had to be
examined under strict scrutiny because it involved the constraining of a fundamental
right of whether to bear children or not).
265. See 410 U.S. 113, 114 (1973) (holding that a Texas statute that made abortion
illegal except to save the mother’s life was unconstitutional because it violated the
right to privacy found in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
266. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 565 (2003).
267. See 410 U.S. at 153 (suggesting that a state’s denial of such a right would
detrimentally affect pregnant women by forcing them to give birth and raise a child).
268. See id. at 155 (stating that most courts have held that “the right to privacy . . .
is broad enough to cover the abortion decision,” but the right has limitations).
269. Id. (citing Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969)).
270. Id. (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)).
271. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (searching for but failing to find a legitimate
state interest that justifies the Texas anti-sodomy law).
272. See id. (finding that Texas cannot demean homosexuals’ existence by
entering into and regulating their private sexual conduct).
273. See id. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (defining the rational basis test as
searching for a legitimate state interest and seeing if the government’s regulation is
rationally related to the furthering of that interest).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol14/iss2/2

42

Lester: Adam and Steve vs. Adam and Eve: Will the New Supreme Court Grant

2006]

ADAM AND STEVE VS. ADAM AND EVE

295

Justice Kennedy could have used one of the other two more
demanding tests (i.e., strict scrutiny or heightened scrutiny) to come
to his conclusions, but he did not.274 If indeed, as Justice Kennedy
indicated, fundamental rights were violated in Lawrence, his failure to
apply a more taxing standard in Lawrence is both confusing and
potentially troubling. Confusing because he offers no explanation for
why he uses a different standard or how the situation in Lawrence
differs from the privacy rights addressed in Griswold or Roe.
Troubling because the lesser standard leaves the door open for states
to successfully offer only a nominal justification for other kinds of
anti-gay legislation in the future. As I said previously, the heightened
scrutiny test is the most appropriate test to use in sexual orientation
discrimination cases because this is the test used in sex discrimination
cases, cases with which sexual orientation discrimination claims have
the most in common.275
Justice Kennedy’s decision, at least
theoretically, relegates gay claimants to a kind of secondary status
when compared to women, since discrimination against women is
subjected to much more rigorous standards of review.276
Despite his application of the less onerous rational basis test in
Lawrence, however, Justice Kennedy still determined that
government-based infringements on certain fundamental rights like
the right to privacy, even when those rights are the rights of gay
Americans of any race or gender, will rarely pass even that test’s
hurdles.277 Whether or not this refusal to approve anti-gay legislation
will apply to all future gay marriage claims, however, remains unclear.
In her concurring opinion in Lawrence, Justice O’Connor also
endorsed the use of the rational basis test, albeit in more nuanced
attire.278 She noted that, in cases such as this, where the law is
designed to hurt a politically marginalized group, “a more searching
form of rational basis review” is required.279 This more searching test
appears to be slightly more rigorous than the traditional rational basis
274. See id. at 565 (comparing Lawrence to cases that found the right of privacy in
the Fourteenth Amendment to be a fundamental liberty interest, and, thus,
mandated strict scrutiny review).
275. See STEPHENS & SCHEB, supra note 158, at 741 (stating that heightened
scrutiny, where you must show a “substantial relationship to an important government
interest,” is the standard most often used for sex discrimination cases).
276. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (applying rational basis review to sexual
orientation discrimination).
277. See id. (finding the Texas statute which made homosexual sodomy a crime to
not pass rational basis review because Texas could not proffer a legitimate state
interest in regulating private conduct between consenting adults).
278. See id. at 579 (O’Connor., J., concurring) (stating that a heightened form of
rational basis review is to be applied when a law seeks to inhibit personal relationships
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
279. Id. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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test, which is usually used to uphold laws that hinder economic or tax
Justice O’Connor focused on the inconsistent
regulation.280
treatment that the Texas law took to the sexual acts in question when
she complained that “[s]odomy between opposite-sex partners . . . is
not a crime in Texas. That is, Texas treats the same conduct
differently based solely on the participants.”281 She also said that
moral animosity towards a particular group can never be a legitimate
reason for the enactment of a law that is subject to rational basis
review.282 Justice O’Connor also explained that since Texas rarely
enforced its sodomy law against gay defendants, “the law serve[d]
more as a statement of dislike and disapproval against homosexuals
than as a tool to stop criminal behavior.”283 This, combined with the
fact that being called a homosexual in Texas is slander per se because
of the associations with criminality that the word evokes, places an
untenable burden on Texas’ gay citizens.284
Justice O’Connor argued that the Equal Protection Clause makes it
clear that people in similar situations must be treated similarly under
the law.285 She therefore concluded:
[T]he State cannot single out one identifiable class of citizens for
punishment that does not apply to everyone else, with moral
disapproval as the only asserted state interest for the law. The Texas
sodomy statute subjects homosexuals to ‘a lifelong penalty and
stigma. A legislative classification that threatens the creation of an
underclass . . . cannot be reconciled with’ the Equal Protection
Clause.286
280. See id. at 579-80 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (asserting that laws that regulate
tax or economic legislation will likely be upheld under rational basis review because
the presumption in the Constitution is that the democratic process will fix imprudent
decisions).
281. Id. at 581 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that her opinion in Bowers
upholding Georgia’s anti-sodomy statute is not inconsistent with her opinion in
Lawrence, since Georgia made it a crime if both opposite sex and same sex sodomy
were involved, whereas Texas only made it a crime if same sex sodomy was involved).
282. See id. at 582 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that the Supreme Court
has “never held that moral disapproval, without any other asserted state interest, is a
sufficient rationale under the Equal Protection Clause to justify a law that
discriminates among groups of persons”).
283. Id. at 583 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
284. See id. at 581-84 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the Texas law labels
all gays as criminals, which makes it harder for them to be treated equal to
heterosexuals) (citing Plumley v. Landmark Chevrolet, Inc., 122 F.3d 308, 310 (5th
Cir. 1997)).
285. See id. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (relying on the Equal Protection
Clause to invalidate the Texas statute because it states that “all persons similarly
situated should be treated alike,” and the Texas law treats homosexuals different from
its other citizens) (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439
(1985)).
286. Id. at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 239
(1982) (Powell, J., concurring)).
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Justice O’Connor was not willing, however, to make a sweeping
statement in Lawrence about the extent to which her opinion could
be relied upon to justify overturning laws that prohibit gays from
being in the military or from being able to marry.287 Handing DOMA
supporters an olive branch in the form of dicta, she said:
Texas cannot assert any legitimate state interest here, such as
national security or preserving the traditional institution of
marriage. Unlike the moral disapproval of same sex relations—the
asserted state interest in this case—other reasons exist to promote
the institution of marriage beyond mere moral disapproval of an
excluded group.288

Thus, when DOMA supporters are next called upon to defend their
legislation in federal court, they will have Justice O’Connor to thank
when the judge allows them to submit testimony about the negative
impact gay marriages have on children with same sex parents, for
instance. However, since Justice O’Connor did not render an opinion
on the merits of these kinds of arguments, gay rights advocates will
also have her to thank when the judge allows them to submit evidence
that refutes this kind of testimony. Indeed, there is much evidence to
support the latter.289
Justice Scalia was very angry about the decision that his more
tolerant colleagues rendered in Lawrence.290 He blamed them for
being unduly influenced by “a law-profession culture, that has largely
signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda, by which I mean the
agenda promoted by some homosexual activists directed at
eliminating the moral opprobrium that has traditionally attached to
homosexual conduct.”291 Criticizing the majority for engaging in the
worst kind of judicial activism, Justice Scalia said that a Court
“impatient of democratic change” had tried to unreasonably interfere
with the state of Texas’ legitimate right to further the wishes of its

287. See id. (distinguishing this case in which no legitimate state interest could be
proffered, from the case where law discriminates against homosexuals to further a
state interest that is rooted in tradition).
288. Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring).
289. See Ethan Jacobs, Damned Lies and Statistics—Pediatricians Debunk RightWing Rhetoric About LGBT Parents, BAY WINDOWS, Oct. 27, 2005, at 11 (discussing
peer-reviewed study of 450 children raised by a lesbian parents or couple, which
showed that “those children were identical to their peers from heterosexual families
in terms of self-esteem, peer relationships, gender-typical behaviors, and prevalence
of psychiatric disorders.”) Children in the study also seemed to be more openminded about diversity issues. Id.
290. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (refocusing the issue of
the liberty interest involved to the right to engage in homosexual sodomy rather than
the right of privacy of two consenting adults at home).
291. Id. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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citizens.292 “[I]t is the premise of our system that those judgments are
to be made by the people, and not imposed by a governing caste that
knows best[,]”293 he complained.
In a short opinion that consists of only a few paragraphs, Justice
Thomas called the Texas law “silly,” saying that if he had been a Texas
legislator he would have voted against it, since the law, to his mind,
required an unnecessary use of government resources to enforce it.294
He said he ultimately would affirm the Texas law, however, because it
is not the role of the Court to find that a general right of privacy
exists.295
Based on the majority opinion written by Justice Kennedy in
Lawrence, however, it is clear that there is a strong constitutional basis
for the position that state and federal DOMAs are unconstitutional
because they violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.296 The only other possible issue that could be raised to
challenge this analysis relates to how the courts would apply the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution to the question at
hand.297
III. THE FULL, FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
The following two scenarios illustrate how full faith and credit
issues would play out in a gay marriage case:
Scenario #1: Imagine that a gay male couple—Adam and Steve—
marry in Massachusetts, and decide to move to Georgia one year later.
Just like their heterosexual counterparts, they expect that Georgia will
recognize their marriage, complete with its accompanying rights and
responsibilities. For instance, if Steve becomes ill and needs to be
hospitalized, Adam should have the right to visit Steve in the hospital,
and make decisions about Steve’s medical treatment in the event that

292. See id. at 603 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the decision of whether to
criminalize homosexual acts or forbid prohibition of homosexual acts is best left to
the legislature and the democratic process).
293. Id. at 603-04 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
294. See id. at 605 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (implying that even though he may
disagree with the law, it is up to the legislature and the democratic process to correct
imprudent decisions) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965)
(Stewart, J., dissenting)).
295. See id. at 605-06 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (asserting that his duty is to “decide
cases agreeably to the Constitution and laws of the United States”) (citing Griswold,
381 U.S. at 530 (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
296. See id. at 578 (finding a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause for
homosexuals to engage in private behavior without government intervention).
297. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (mandating that “Full Faith and Credit shall be
given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every
other State”).
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Steve becomes incapacitated. Adam should also be able to inherit all
of Steve’s assets should Steve die.
Scenario #2: In the alternative, if Adam and Steve end up getting a
divorce while still living in Massachusetts, and then move to Georgia
separately, both should be able to expect that the terms of their
divorce will be honored in Georgia. Even if the two men were to
move to Georgia and then get divorced there, they should still be
entitled to the same rights, since:
A married person has: the ability to get divorced in her state of
residence, regardless of where the marriage was celebrated, and the
right to seek property distribution under that state’s laws; the right
to inherit even if their spouse dies intestate (without a will) or tries
to disinherit them (in which case they still get the “spousal share”);
and the right to sue for wrongful death if their spouses [sic] dies as
a result of medical malpractice or other negligence.298

Georgia, however, passed a DOMA in 2004, and most Georgia
courts would no doubt refuse to recognize either the marital rights or
the divorce arrangements just described. Indeed, the federal DOMA
supports Georgia’s right to do just that because it attempts “to ensure
that no state would be forced under the Full Faith and Credit Clause
against its will to recognize a same sex marriage legally contracted in a
sister state.”299 In response, Adam (in the first scenario) or Steve (in
the second scenario) might decide to challenge the Georgia courts in
federal court by claiming that the Georgia courts, as well as the
federal DOMA, violate their Full Faith and Credit rights under the
U.S. Constitution.
As mentioned earlier, the Full Faith and Credit Clause provides that
each state must give full recognition to the public acts and records of
each other state.300 The Framers of the U.S. Constitution hoped that
the clause would be used to combat “‘the disintegrating influence of
provincialism.’”301 Thus, since marriage is a matter of public record,
Georgia should have to honor the rights of both men outlined in
both scenarios.302 However, even though courts usually honor out of
298. Joanna Grossman, Will Other States Recognize Vermont’s Civil Unions?,
CNN.Com, May 20, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/05/20/findlaw.
analysis.grossman.civilunions.txt/index.html.
299. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. & E. Gary Spitko, Navigating Dangerous
Constitutional Straits: A Prolegomenon on the Federal Marriage Amendment and the
Disenfranchisement of Sexual Minorities, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 599, 606 (2005) (citing
28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West 2005)).
300. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
301. Steve Sanders, Op-Ed.,‘Full Faith’ for Judgments, NAT’L L. J., Feb. 21, 2005, at
A27.
302. See, e.g., 52 AM. JUR. 2D Marriage § 63 (2005) (stating that “a marriage which
is valid under the law of the state or country in which it is contracted will generally be
recognized as valid”).
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state marriages, it is a generally accepted principle of law that they are
not required to do so in cases where the marriage in question would
be in conflict with the state’s public policy.303 As the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled as recently as 1998, a state does not have to replace its
statutes with the statutes of other states “dealing with a subject matter
concerning which it is competent to legislate . . . . A court may
[instead] be guided by the forum State’s ‘public policy’ in
determining the law applicable to a controversy.”304
Sometimes state courts exercise the public policy exception and
rule against out of state marriages that were not formed in
compliance with their home state’s licensing criteria.305 For example,
courts in New York and Connecticut refused to recognize out of state
marriages in which the parties were engaging in bigamy or incest.306
Other courts, however, decline to exercise the public policy
exception, giving deference to the fact that applying the new home
state’s rules to the couple in question could wreak havoc on their
lives. For instance, some courts in Arkansas and Indiana have
recognized out of state marriages that did not comply with home state
minimum age or blood relation restrictions.307 In light of the above,
a Georgia state court could refuse to recognize Adam and Steve’s
marriage in Scenario 1 or their subsequent divorce in Scenario 2 on
the grounds that Georgia public policy, as articulated in Georgia’s
DOMA, allows it to do so.
303. See Joshua K. Baker, Status, Benefits, and Recognition: Current Controversies
in the Marriage Debate, 18 B.Y.U.J. PUB. L. 569, 609-10 (2004) (noting that other
states have typically rejected recognizing out of state marriages when there was
bigamy or incest involved because these things were against the state’s public policy)
(citing 52 AM. JUR. 2D Marriage § 63 (2005)).
304. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 552 U.S. 222, 232 (1998) (quoting Milwaukee
County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 277 (1935)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
CONFLICTS OF LAW § 6 (1971) (stating that “a marriage which satisfies the
requirements of the state where the marriage was contracted will everywhere be
recognized as valid unless it violates the strong public policy of another state which
had the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of
the marriage.”).
305. See Baker, supra note 303, at 610 (delineating cases where the state will
accept out of state marriages when the marriage involves a difference in the age of
the parties, first cousin relationships and common law marriages from cases where a
state will not recognize out of state marriages if the marriage involves bigamy or
incest).
306. See, e.g., People v. Ezeonu, 588 N.Y.S.2d 116, 118 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992)
(stating that “[w]hile Nigerian law and custom may permit a ‘junior wife,’ New York
does not recognize such status); Catalano v. Catalano, 170 A.2d 726, 728 (Conn.
1961) (barring recognition of marriage in Connecticut of a uncle and niece who were
legally married in Italy)).
307. See, e.g., State v. Graves, 307 S.W.2d 545, 553 (Ark. 1957) (recognizing out of
state marriage of thirteen-year-old girl that would not be allowed under local law);
Mason v. Mason, 775 N.E.2d 706, 711 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (recognizing out of state
marriage between first cousins not otherwise legal under local law).
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When one looks at how the Supreme Court has addressed the issue
of marriage, however, any attempt by a Georgia court to invoke the
public policy exception can not stand. The Loving v. Virginia case is
illustrative of this point.308 In Loving, the two plaintiffs married in
the District of Columbia, where interracial marriage was legal, and
moved back to Virginia, where it was not.309 The Supreme Court
sidestepped the issue of whether or not Virginia should grant full faith
and credit recognition to the D.C. marriage altogether, and decided
the case on Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and due
process grounds.310 It ruled that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment
requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by
invidious racial discriminations.”311 In a similar vein, it can be argued
that invidious discrimination against gay people is at the heart of the
defense of the marriage movement. Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v.
Texas show that such discrimination is not a sufficiently legitimate
reason to justify laws targeted to exclude gays from the Fourteenth
Amendment’s protections.312 Therefore, absent a constitutional
amendment to the contrary, even generally recognized exceptions to
the Full Faith and Credit Clause can not be used to justify state or
federal DOMAs that attempt to ban gay marriage.
CONCLUSION: GAY MARRIAGE AND THE NEW SUPREME COURT
In the fall of 2005, Chief Justice Rehnquist died at the age of eighty,
ending his longstanding campaign to undo most of the legal gains
made by civil rights advocates over the past fifty years, starting with the
Court’s 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education, which made
government sanctioned racial segregation illegal.313 While working as
a clerk to Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson in the 1950s,

308. See 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) (finding that preservation of racial homogeneity is
not a valid public policy).
309. See id. at 2-3 (stating that the couple left their residence in Virginia to be
married in the District of Columbia, which allowed interracial marriage, and then
returned to Virginia, hoping that the state would recognize their marriage under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause).
310. See id. at 12 (finding the Virginia statute criminalizing interracial marriage to
be unconstitutional and, thus, not reaching the issue whether Virginia would have to
recognize an interracial marriage in the District of Columbia).
311. Id.
312. See 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (holding that a Colorado Amendment is
unconstitutional where its only legislative goal is to make homosexuals unequal to the
rest of its citizens); 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (decrying Texas’s purported goal of
demeaning gays and making them unequal to other citizens as not a legitimate
interest).
313. See Lane, supra note 26, at A1 (stating that Chief Justice Rehnquist waged
“his own war of ideas against liberalism,” starting with a scathing memo about the
decision in Brown).
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Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a memo characterizing as
“pathological” claims made by civil rights groups about the prevalence
of racism in America.314 He also wrote another memo praising the
famous 1896 decision, Plessy v. Ferguson, in which the Court ruled
that states should be allowed to adopt laws that sanction racial
segregation, a decision later overturned by the Court in Brown.315
While on the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist sided against the majority
in Grutter v. Bollinger, which upheld the right of state educational
institutions to use race-based affirmative action programs,316 and in
Bob Jones University, which declared that private universities
discriminating against blacks could not obtain tax exempt status.317
He also disagreed with the majority’s rulings in Roe v. Wade,318 which
upheld a woman’s right to choose, Romer v. Evans,319 which
overturned state laws excluding gays from participating in the political
process, and Lawrence v. Texas,320 which declared state anti-sodomy
laws unconstitutional. It is therefore fairly clear that, had Chief Justice
Rehnquist survived to see a gay marriage claim come before the
Court, he would have voted against it.
In the Summer of 2005, just a few months prior to Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s passing, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor announced that
she would retire from the Supreme Court after twenty-four years of
service.321 Justice O’Connor, who once supported the Georgia antisodomy law upheld in the Bowers decision,322 voted seventeen years
314. See id. (asserting that he “take[s] a dim view of this pathological search for
discrimination against blacks”).
315. See id. (noting that historians have been skeptical of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
explanation that he wrote the memo reflecting Justice Jackson’s opinion and not his
own opinion).
316. See 539 U.S. 306, 307 (2003) (holding that consideration of race in
determining college admissions is constitutional as long as it is narrowly tailored and
furthers the compelling state interest of diversity in the classroom).
317. See Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 575 (1983) (holding
that an educational institution with discriminatory admissions policies is contrary to
public policy and therefore cannot qualify for charitable federal tax exemptions).
318. See 410 U.S. 113, 176 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
plaintiff did not have standing in the case and even if there was a valid plaintiff there
is no such privacy right that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees).
319. See 517 U.S. 620, 640 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (joining the
dissenters who argued that Coloradans wanted to preserve traditional morals against a
minority when they passed the state’s amendment and that this was the legitimate
rational basis required to uphold the state’s amendment under Constitutional attack).
320. See 539 U.S. 558, 599 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Court should have followed past precedent and that there was a rational basis for the
Texas statute).
321. See Thomas & Taylor, supra note 25, at 25-6 (discussing how O’Connor’s
retirement will result in the loss of a crucial swing vote on the Supreme Court).
322. See 478 U.S. 186, 187 (1986) (noting that Justice O’Connor joined Justice
White’s majority opinion that the Constitution does not give homosexuals the
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later in Lawrence to overturn Texas’ anti-sodomy statute because she
said it unfairly targeted gay people for conduct that heterosexuals
engaged in as well.323 Even though she reached this conclusion, and
sometimes constituted the swing vote in other so-called liberal court
rulings,324 the prospects for a pro-gay marriage decision endorsed by
Justice O’Connor could hardly have been described as certain.
Indeed, as was the case with her position on anti-sodomy laws, many
of her decisions on other important civil rights issues like affirmative
action have not been consistent.325 Also, as I mentioned previously,
Justice O’Connor made it clear in her concurring opinion in
Lawrence that she was not giving a carte blanche to each and every
gay rights claim that might make its way to the Court.326 Claims
brought by gays barred from serving in the military or from marrying
each other in states that have enacted DOMAs are the two examples
she said were not necessarily protected under the rational basis test.327
Thus, it is not clear that Justice O’Connor would have voted in favor
of gay marriage had she not decided to retire.
How Rehnquist successor, Chief Justice Roberts, and O’Connor
successor, Justice Alito, will deal with the issue of gay marriage is the
subject of much debate. Although Roberts was a law clerk for
Rehnquist, it is not so easy to determine whether Roberts is cut from
the same anti-gay cloth as his former mentor.328 On one hand, the
new Chief Justice wrote briefs opposing abortion and advocating for
the reversal of Roe v. Wade in his role as deputy solicitor general

fundamental right to engage in sodomy).
323. See 539 U.S. at 582 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (distinguishing this case from
Bowers by holding that the Texas statute violated the Equal Protection Clause while
Bowers only involved analysis under substantive due process).
324. See Thomas & Taylor, supra note 25, at 29-30 (documenting how Justice
O’Connor “gradually inched to the left on the great, and divisive, social issues, taking
the court with her”).
325. Compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003) (endorsing the use of
race-based affirmative action plans in educational settings), with Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 238 (1995) (refusing to approve a federal
government sponsored affirmative action plan that sought to level the playing field
for minority businesses that racism harmed).
326. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the
Texas law is unconstitutional as applied to private conducts of adults, but “that does
not mean that other laws distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals
would similarly fail under rational basis review”).
327. See id. (O’Connor, J., concurring) (finding that the preservation of national
security and marriage were legitimate state interests, and that statutes regulating them
would pass rational basis review if the language was rationally related to these
interests).
328. See Jeffrey Rosen, Op-Ed., In Search of John Roberts, N.Y. TIMES, July 21,
2005, at A29 (asserting that John Roberts’ stance on stare decisis has been indecisive
and is vague).
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during the 1990s.329 During this time, he also advocated for
restrictions on school busing and other policies geared at promoting
minority civil rights. 330 On the other hand, Roberts helped gay rights
groups prepare their arguments before the Court in the Romer case,
when his law firm agreed to handle the case on a pro bono basis.331
Nevertheless, Human Rights Campaign President Joe Solmonese
warns that “Roberts has . . . urged that [Roe] . . . be overruled.
Reversing Roe could undermine fundamental rights to privacy and
liberty that are the legal underpinning for the freedom of gay,
lesbian, bisexual and transgender Americans.”332 Kevin Cathcart,
Executive Director of the gay public interest law firm, Lambda Legal
Defense and Education Fund, says that he is still concerned about
Roberts’ much more extensive advocacy of positions that the
organization opposes.333
Gay marriage proponents are also concerned about Justice Samuel
Alito. Like Roberts, Alito has a track record of attacking the
constitutionality of a woman’s right to choose. For instance, on a
1985 application for a political appointment within the Reagan
administration, Alito said that he was “‘particularly proud’ of his work
on cases in which the Reagan White House had argued ‘that the
Constitution does not protect a right to abortion.’”334 He also wrote a
dissenting opinion in the 1991 appeals court case, Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, in which he said that “Pennsylvania has a
legitimate interest in furthering the husband’s interest in the fate of
the fetus.”335 The Supreme Court rejected this view, which would
have required a woman seeking an abortion to first notify her
husband, thus reaffirming the basic guarantees promised in Roe v.
329. See id. at A29 (opining that even though Roberts signed government briefs
advocating the overturning of Roe, he was only advocating for the position of the
federal government, his employer).
330. See Maura Reynolds, Roberts Gay Rights Case Surprises Friends and Foes:
Supreme Court Nominee Helped as Part of His Pro Bono Work, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 5,
2005, at A6 (asserting that some liberals consider Roberts to be much more
conservative than he admits).
331. See id. (mentioning that Roberts did not bring up his participation in the
Romer case while responding to the Senate’s inquiries).
332. Supreme Court Nominee, BAY WINDOWS, July 21, 2005, available at
http://www.baywindows.com/media/paper328/news/2005/07/21/News/Supreme.
Court.Nominee-963683.shtml.
333. See id. (“There are a number of issues that are important in determining
whether a nominee will respect the rights of all Americans. Judge Roberts’ track
record on reproductive freedom, privacy and federalism . . . merits particular
scrutiny.”)
334. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & David D. Kirkpatrick, Nominee Plays Down Remarks on
Quotas and Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2005, at A16.
335. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 726 (3d Cir.
1991).
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Wade.336
Alito’s record on gay rights issues during his time serving on the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit during the past fifteen
years is a bit more mixed. In a recent case most closely related to the
gay marriage issue, he gave a very traditional reading of the meaning
of marriage. He ruled that the boyfriends of women forced to have
abortions in China did not have the same right to seek asylum as did
the husbands of women who had undergone the same hardship,
reasoning that “marriage was a central organizing principle in the
law,” and that to grant asylum protection “to nonspouses would create
numerous practical difficulties.”337 In another case, Alito sided with
the majority of the court when it concluded that a university antiharassment policy, which included prohibitions on the harassment of
gays and other minorities, was an unconstitutional infringement of
first amendment rights.338 But in another decision, he ruled that a
New Jersey school district was obligated to fund a male student’s
transfer to a new school because the student was being called “faggot,”
“homo” and “gay” and harassed because he was perceived to be
effeminate by his classmates.339 Finally, in a case that addressed the
right of a municipality to block HIV-positive adults from taking in
non-HIV-positive foster children, he said that the municipality’s
“blanket policy discriminates against the Does because of (their son’s)
HIV-positive status even though the probability of HIV transmission,
and consequently the risk, is next to zero.”340
Taking Alito’s record as a whole, however, Joe Solmonese said in a
press release issued during the former circuit judge’s nomination
hearings: “A glance at . . . [Alito’s] resume reads like an anti-gay
textbook. From striking down a policy that protected gay students
from harassment to his view that would threaten Congress’ power to
enact non-discrimination laws, he’s the wrong choice for the
court.”341 Solmonese’s instincts about Alito may yet turn out to be
true, since soon after Alito was sworn in for his new position on the
336. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
337. Adam Liptak, In Abortion Rulings, Idea of Marriage is Pivotal, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 2, 2005, at A1.
338. Lou Chibbaro, Jr., Gay Groups Oppose Alito Nomination, Dec. 12, 2005,
http://www.washblade.com/thelatest/thelatest.cfm?blog_id=4008;
Kathi
Wolfe,
Alito’s Record on Gay Rights a Mixed Bag, Jan. 9, 2006, http://www.progressive.org/
media_mpwolfe010906.
339. See Wolfe, supra note 338.
340. See id. (quoting Doe v. County of Centre, 242 F.3d 437, 451 (2001)).
341. Press Release, Human Rights Campaign, Full Senate Can Protect Fairness with
Vote Against Alito, Jan. 4, 2006, http://www.hrc.org/Content/Content
Groups/News_Releases/2006/Full_Senate_Can_Protect_Fairness_with_Vote_Against
_Alito.htm.
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Court, he sent a thank you letter to James Dobston, head of the
conservative anti-gay marriage, anti-abortion rights group, Focus on
the Family, saying “the prayers of so many people from around the
country were a palpable and powerful force. As long as I serve on the
Supreme Court, I will keep in mind the trust that has been placed in
me.”342 That trust will be put to the test in an abortion case the
Supreme Court is scheduled to decide on in the Fall of 2006. The
case, brought by the Bush administration, challenges a lower court
decision declaring the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 illegal,
which makes it a crime when a doctor performs an abortion on a fetus
that is partially outside the uterus at the time of the abortion.343 The
Act allows such abortions to take place if the pregnant woman’s life,
but not her health, is threatened. Since the Court found that a
similar restriction on a woman’s health needs rendered a Nebraska
state law unconstitutional several years ago,344 it would appear that
the whole question of a woman’s right to choose and the
accompanying privacy rights previously championed by the Court will
be called into question. A decision that weakens these rights could
have serious consequences for gay marriage advocates.
Any judge on the new Supreme Court who is inclined to overturn
Roe or rely on such a decision to deny gays the right to marry,
however, will have to do a great deal of intellectual maneuvering to
justify such a position. As Justice Kennedy said in his majority opinion
in Lawrence, the right of gays to marry derives directly from the
Fourteenth Amendment and the judicial interpretations thereof.345
Furthermore, given the fact that Justice O’Connor relied on Roe and
its many equal protection and due process precursors in her
concurring opinion in Lawrence,346 and the fact that our common
law system expects judges to give great deference to legal precedent,
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito would be hard pressed to
ignore decades of legal jurisprudence pointing in the opposite
342. Colleen Slevin, Dobson Says Alito Sent Thank-You Note for Backing His
Nomination, ASSOC. PRESS, Mar. 2, 2006, available at http://web.lexisnexis.com/universe/document?_m=fbf0c2150b91476f9fafdc8433358218
&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkVA&_md5=bbd89d162a9ebf7d4a1a6af108e3d422.
343. Linda Greenhouse, Justices to Review Ban on Disputed Abortion Method,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2006, at A1.
344. Id.
345. See 539 U.S. 558, 573-74 (2003) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment
provides protection for personal decisions about marriage, and that homosexuals in
relationships have autonomy to make decisions about marriage just as heterosexuals
can).
346. See id. at 582 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (contrasting Lawrence from
Bowers, which rested upon substantive due process and analogizing Lawrence to
other cases in which the Court has held that statutes legislating moral animus towards
a group are to be analyzed under the Equal Protection Clause).
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direction. Chief Justice Roberts himself said during his federal
judgeship confirmation hearings that he would honor precedent.347
And asked about his views on the subject, Alito told one Senator
during a closed door interview that “he has tremendous respect for
precedent . . . and that his approach is not to overturn cases due to a
disagreement with how they were originally decided.”348 Both
nominees’ remarks are in stark contrast to the views of Justice
Clarence Thomas. Known for his ultra conservative stances on issues
pertaining to civil rights, Thomas has said that he would overturn any
case that is inconsistent with the framers’s original intent in writing
the Constitution.349
Although it is difficult to predict with certainty what the ultimate
decision will be when the Supreme Court next meets to consider a gay
marriage claim, I believe that if each member of the Court renders a
decision that is in line with his or her views in the Lawrence decision,
or in views expressed elsewhere as just discussed, the final decision
will be that gay marriage is a fundamental right guaranteed under the
Constitution. That is because even if Justices Scalia, Roberts, Alito
and Thomas all vote against such a position, there is a strong chance
that Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Souter, Stevens and Breyer will do
just the opposite. In rendering such a decision, the justices who are
hoping to champion gay marriage might want to take their counsel
from the federal district court judge in the May 2005 Nebraska case,
Citizens for Equal Protection, Inc. v. Bruning.350 The Bruning court
appreciated the gravity of passing laws that attempt to deny equal
rights to an entire segment of the population. In the first ruling of its
347. See Rosen, supra note 328, at A29 (commenting during his confirmation
hearings for his appellate position that he was bound by stare decisis). But see
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577 (noting that Justice Kennedy may have unwittingly opened
the door for Justice Roberts and his more conservative colleagues to break with
precedent and overrule Lawrence and Romer). Justice Kennedy states:
The doctrine of stare decisis is essential to the respect accorded to the
judgments of the Court and to the stability of the law. It is not, however, an
inexorable command. In Casey we noted that when a court is asked to
overrule a precedent recognizing a constitutional liberty interest, individual
or societal reliance on the existence of that liberty cautions with particular
strength against reversing course.
Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855-56
(1992)).
348. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & David D. Kirkpatrick, Judge Woos Both Sides on
Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2005, at A20.
349. See Rosen, supra note 328, at A29 (stating that both Justice Thomas and
Justice Scalia are Constitutional originalists and would overturn any precedent that
strayed from the intent of the Framers of the Constitution).
350. See 368 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1008 (D. Neb. 2005) (holding that Section 29 of the
Nebraska Constitution, which limited marriage to a man and woman and prohibited
recognition of same sex marriage from other states, was unconstitutional as it was a
“denial of equal protection”).
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kind, Judge Batallion overturned a state of Nebraska constitutional
amendment that limited marriage to opposite sex couples and
prevented the state from recognizing gay marriages officiated outside
Nebraska.351
Judge Bataillon classified Nebraska’s law as “indistinguishable” from
the anti-gay amendment that Colorado passed and that was
overturned in Romer v. Evans.352 Bataillon recognized that the Full
Faith and Credit Clause did little to protect the rights of married gay
couples who had recently moved to Nebraska.353 Despite this finding,
the Judge decided that the amendment was illegal because there was a
strong link between the denial of the plaintiff’s fundamental First
Amendment rights to participate in the political process, and the
plaintiff’s right to equal protection and to due process under the
law.354 The Judge concluded that, “[b]ecause intrusions on First
Amendment rights are often accompanied by invidious or irrational
animus against a certain group, a First Amendment infringement can
also be analyzed as the deprivation of a fundamental interest under
the Equal Protection Clause when accompanied by proof of such
discriminatory animus.”355 The Judge also drew the connection
between the First Amendment right to free association and the right
to marry.356 He reasoned that “[t]he First Amendment’s ban on
government abridgment of speech and peaceable assembly ‘anchors
all [of the decisions relating to a due process liberty interest] most
firmly in the Constitution’s explicit text.’”357
It is important to note that Judge Batallion didn’t reach his

351. See id. at 987 (stating that Nebraska citizens voted for the amendment
because of their concerns that Nebraska would have to recognize a lawful marriage
between same sex couples from another state).
352. See id. at 1002 (finding the Nebraska statute indistinguishable from the
Colorado amendment because they both try to “impose a broad disability on a single
group,” homosexuals).
353. See id. at 987 n.5 (stating that according to the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
states do not have to automatically recognize marriages that happened in other states
if the marriage from the other state is against public policy) (citing Patrick J.
Borchers, The Essential Irrelevance of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to the Samesex Marriage Debate, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 233, 353-64 (2005)).
354. See id. at 990-91 (asserting that the constitutional protections that the First
Amendment and the Fourth Amendment envision intersect “when the state interferes
with an individual’s selection of those whom they wish to join in a common
endeavor”).
355. Id. at 989 n.8.
356. See id. at 990 (finding similarities between the right to free association and
the right to marry because the right to marry involves the personal choice of an
individual desiring personal association).
357. Id. at 989 n.9 (citing Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The
“Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1939-40
(2004).
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conclusions by applying either the strict scrutiny test or the rational
basis test. Instead, he reasoned that when the first ten amendments
or laws that try to restrict access to the political process are involved,
heightened scrutiny should be applied to determine their
He explained that “[t]he court need not
constitutionality.358
determine whether, once a law is found to be directed at a ‘politically
unpopular group,’ more searching scrutiny is required.”359 The
Judge therefore seems to have appropriately departed from the
rational basis test standard of review implicitly used in Romer and
overtly used in Lawrence, and raised the bar for those who hope to
justify DOMAs by simply stating that there is a good reason for those
laws, as opposed to a reason that is substantially related to an
important government interest. 360 It could be argued that Justice
O’Connor’s call for the use of a “more searching rational basis test” in
Lawrence laid the groundwork for Judge Bataillon to do what he did,
since the line between heightened scrutiny and a more searching
rational basis standard can hardly be described as clear.361
The Supreme Court has still not clarified whether or not the
rational basis test should be used in all gay rights cases.362 If the
Court were to affirm Judge Bataillon’s use of the heightened scrutiny
test, it would be harder for states to successfully defend their DOMAs
before it.363 Judge Bataillon therefore seems to be trying to force the
Court’s hand and make it decide once and for all that gays deserve to
be protected at least to the same extent as women in sex
discrimination cases, where the heightened scrutiny test is normally
used.364
358. Id. at 1001 n.19 (requiring heightened scrutiny when legislation affects “a
specific prohibition of the Constitution”) (citing United States v. Carolene Products,
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
359. Id. at 1002 n.20 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003)
(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
360. See STEHPHENS & SCHEB, supra note 158, at 741 (asserting that heightened
scrutiny falls between rational basis review and strict scrutiny and demands that the
state show that a statute “bears a substantial relationship to an important government
interest”).
361. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (prescribing that a
higher standard of rational basis review should be used when a law is designed to
detriment a politically unpopular segment of the population, but failing to exhibit
what this heightened review would look like).
362. See Kristina Brittenham, Equal Protection Theory and the Harvey Milk High
School: Why Anti-Subordination Alone Is Not Enough, 45 B.C.L. REV. 869, 890
(2004) (noting that the Supreme Court has strayed from the traditional rational basis
test but has failed to commit to an elevated standard of review).
363. See STEPHENS & SCHEB, supra note 158, at 741 (implying that the rational basis
test is a “less stringent” test, thus making it easier for the government to abridge
certain rights that others would consider fundamental).
364. See id. (conveying that the heightened scrutiny test is most often applied to
claims of sex discrimination).
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Judge Bataillon said that the government’s stated reason for the
law—the wish to protect the traditional institution of marriage—is not
credible, especially since the new law affects all kinds of transactions
that have nothing to do with marriage.365 Private parties wishing to
enter into real estate or prenuptial contracts, or business agreements
could also be restricted from doing so by the law,366 since it bars “any
recognition of a ‘domestic partnership,’ ‘civil union,’ or ‘same sex
relationship.’”367 Even two people of the same sex who sign a lease in
order to rent an apartment together might not be able to do so if the
letter of the law was strictly enforced.368
Judge Bataillon had it right. State and federal DOMAs are
unconstitutional because they infringe upon fundamental rights and
attempt to deny equal protection and due process rights to gay
citizens.369 DOMAs, the way they are currently written, are either so
arbitrary in their reach or so motivated by the desire to disenfranchise
gays that they will always fall short of the heightened scrutiny test, or
either of the other two standards of legal review for that matter. One
can only hope that when the new Supreme Court eventually chooses
to review Bataillon’s decision, or one just like it, the Court will see the
wisdom in his analysis and follow suit.
I am cautiously enthusiastic about a pro-gay marriage victory in the
Supreme Court, however, for the following reasons. By focusing
almost exclusively on marriage—an institution that, given its
associations with family life, and the presumed stability of certain
kinds of mainstream monogamous relationships, is inherently
conservative and assimilationist in nature—same sex marriage
advocates may be unwittingly participating in a strategy that shifts the
focus off of other, equally important social justice causes like the fight
for economic and distributive justice, the fight to end sexism and
racism, and the fight to protect the rights of other more politically
expendable sexual minorities, like single and non-monogamous
people of all sexual persuasions. As I discussed in Part II, proposed
legal protections favoring gay marriage therefore run the risk of
serving to produce yet another class of economically and socially
365. See Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1005 (D.
Neb. 2005) (finding that the amendment invalidates different activities that are
unrelated to marriage such as “a lease agreement involving two same-sex persons who
share an apartment”).
366. See id. (asserting that “[s]ection 29 prohibits contracts, benefits and
arrangements that already receive recognition in various forms in Nebraska).
367. Id. at 1004 (citing NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29, held unconstitutional by Bruning,
368 F. Supp. 2d 980).
368. See id. at 1005.
369. See id. (holding that Section 29 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
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privileged Americans who are distanced from those who are subjected
to these other forms of inequality. Therefore, to paraphrase a
traditional African-American saying, I would hope that people in the
gay marriage movement remember to “lift up others as they climb,” by
refusing to rest on their laurels once a positive decision is
forthcoming, and continuing to work for a wider vision of social
justice than the marriage movement currently embraces. Otherwise,
victory in the marriage wars will be bittersweet.
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